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diff --git a/doc/ikev2/[RFC4301] - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol.txt b/doc/ikev2/[RFC4301] - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4a8eba975..000000000 --- a/doc/ikev2/[RFC4301] - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5659 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - -Network Working Group S. Kent -Request for Comments: 4301 K. Seo -Obsoletes: 2401 BBN Technologies -Category: Standards Track December 2005 - - - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol - -Status of This Memo - - This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the - Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for - improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet - Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state - and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. - -Copyright Notice - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). - -Abstract - - This document describes an updated version of the "Security - Architecture for IP", which is designed to provide security services - for traffic at the IP layer. This document obsoletes RFC 2401 - (November 1998). - -Dedication - - This document is dedicated to the memory of Charlie Lynn, a long-time - senior colleague at BBN, who made very significant contributions to - the IPsec documents. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 1] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -Table of Contents - - 1. Introduction ....................................................4 - 1.1. Summary of Contents of Document ............................4 - 1.2. Audience ...................................................4 - 1.3. Related Documents ..........................................5 - 2. Design Objectives ...............................................5 - 2.1. Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description ..........5 - 2.2. Caveats and Assumptions ....................................6 - 3. System Overview .................................................7 - 3.1. What IPsec Does ............................................7 - 3.2. How IPsec Works ............................................9 - 3.3. Where IPsec Can Be Implemented ............................10 - 4. Security Associations ..........................................11 - 4.1. Definition and Scope ......................................12 - 4.2. SA Functionality ..........................................16 - 4.3. Combining SAs .............................................17 - 4.4. Major IPsec Databases .....................................18 - 4.4.1. The Security Policy Database (SPD) .................19 - 4.4.1.1. Selectors .................................26 - 4.4.1.2. Structure of an SPD Entry .................30 - 4.4.1.3. More Regarding Fields Associated - with Next Layer Protocols .................32 - 4.4.2. Security Association Database (SAD) ................34 - 4.4.2.1. Data Items in the SAD .....................36 - 4.4.2.2. Relationship between SPD, PFP - flag, packet, and SAD .....................38 - 4.4.3. Peer Authorization Database (PAD) ..................43 - 4.4.3.1. PAD Entry IDs and Matching Rules ..........44 - 4.4.3.2. IKE Peer Authentication Data ..............45 - 4.4.3.3. Child SA Authorization Data ...............46 - 4.4.3.4. How the PAD Is Used .......................46 - 4.5. SA and Key Management .....................................47 - 4.5.1. Manual Techniques ..................................48 - 4.5.2. Automated SA and Key Management ....................48 - 4.5.3. Locating a Security Gateway ........................49 - 4.6. SAs and Multicast .........................................50 - 5. IP Traffic Processing ..........................................50 - 5.1. Outbound IP Traffic Processing - (protected-to-unprotected) ................................52 - 5.1.1. Handling an Outbound Packet That Must Be - Discarded ..........................................54 - 5.1.2. Header Construction for Tunnel Mode ................55 - 5.1.2.1. IPv4: Header Construction for - Tunnel Mode ...............................57 - 5.1.2.2. IPv6: Header Construction for - Tunnel Mode ...............................59 - 5.2. Processing Inbound IP Traffic (unprotected-to-protected) ..59 - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 2] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - 6. ICMP Processing ................................................63 - 6.1. Processing ICMP Error Messages Directed to an - IPsec Implementation ......................................63 - 6.1.1. ICMP Error Messages Received on the - Unprotected Side of the Boundary ...................63 - 6.1.2. ICMP Error Messages Received on the - Protected Side of the Boundary .....................64 - 6.2. Processing Protected, Transit ICMP Error Messages .........64 - 7. Handling Fragments (on the protected side of the IPsec - boundary) ......................................................66 - 7.1. Tunnel Mode SAs that Carry Initial and Non-Initial - Fragments .................................................67 - 7.2. Separate Tunnel Mode SAs for Non-Initial Fragments ........67 - 7.3. Stateful Fragment Checking ................................68 - 7.4. BYPASS/DISCARD Traffic ....................................69 - 8. Path MTU/DF Processing .........................................69 - 8.1. DF Bit ....................................................69 - 8.2. Path MTU (PMTU) Discovery .................................70 - 8.2.1. Propagation of PMTU ................................70 - 8.2.2. PMTU Aging .........................................71 - 9. Auditing .......................................................71 - 10. Conformance Requirements ......................................71 - 11. Security Considerations .......................................72 - 12. IANA Considerations ...........................................72 - 13. Differences from RFC 2401 .....................................72 - 14. Acknowledgements ..............................................75 - Appendix A: Glossary ..............................................76 - Appendix B: Decorrelation .........................................79 - B.1. Decorrelation Algorithm ...................................79 - Appendix C: ASN.1 for an SPD Entry ................................82 - Appendix D: Fragment Handling Rationale ...........................88 - D.1. Transport Mode and Fragments ..............................88 - D.2. Tunnel Mode and Fragments .................................89 - D.3. The Problem of Non-Initial Fragments ......................90 - D.4. BYPASS/DISCARD Traffic ....................................93 - D.5. Just say no to ports? .....................................94 - D.6. Other Suggested Solutions..................................94 - D.7. Consistency................................................95 - D.8. Conclusions................................................95 - Appendix E: Example of Supporting Nested SAs via SPD and - Forwarding Table Entries...............................96 - References.........................................................98 - Normative References............................................98 - Informative References..........................................99 - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 3] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -1. Introduction - -1.1. Summary of Contents of Document - - This document specifies the base architecture for IPsec-compliant - systems. It describes how to provide a set of security services for - traffic at the IP layer, in both the IPv4 [Pos81a] and IPv6 [DH98] - environments. This document describes the requirements for systems - that implement IPsec, the fundamental elements of such systems, and - how the elements fit together and fit into the IP environment. It - also describes the security services offered by the IPsec protocols, - and how these services can be employed in the IP environment. This - document does not address all aspects of the IPsec architecture. - Other documents address additional architectural details in - specialized environments, e.g., use of IPsec in Network Address - Translation (NAT) environments and more comprehensive support for IP - multicast. The fundamental components of the IPsec security - architecture are discussed in terms of their underlying, required - functionality. Additional RFCs (see Section 1.3 for pointers to - other documents) define the protocols in (a), (c), and (d). - - a. Security Protocols -- Authentication Header (AH) and - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) - b. Security Associations -- what they are and how they work, - how they are managed, associated processing - c. Key Management -- manual and automated (The Internet Key - Exchange (IKE)) - d. Cryptographic algorithms for authentication and encryption - - This document is not a Security Architecture for the Internet; it - addresses security only at the IP layer, provided through the use of - a combination of cryptographic and protocol security mechanisms. - - The spelling "IPsec" is preferred and used throughout this and all - related IPsec standards. All other capitalizations of IPsec (e.g., - IPSEC, IPSec, ipsec) are deprecated. However, any capitalization of - the sequence of letters "IPsec" should be understood to refer to the - IPsec protocols. - - The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, - SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this - document, are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [Bra97]. - -1.2. Audience - - The target audience for this document is primarily individuals who - implement this IP security technology or who architect systems that - will use this technology. Technically adept users of this technology - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 4] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - (end users or system administrators) also are part of the target - audience. A glossary is provided in Appendix A to help fill in gaps - in background/vocabulary. This document assumes that the reader is - familiar with the Internet Protocol (IP), related networking - technology, and general information system security terms and - concepts. - -1.3. Related Documents - - As mentioned above, other documents provide detailed definitions of - some of the components of IPsec and of their interrelationship. They - include RFCs on the following topics: - - a. security protocols -- RFCs describing the Authentication - Header (AH) [Ken05b] and Encapsulating Security Payload - (ESP) [Ken05a] protocols. - b. cryptographic algorithms for integrity and encryption -- one - RFC that defines the mandatory, default algorithms for use - with AH and ESP [Eas05], a similar RFC that defines the - mandatory algorithms for use with IKEv2 [Sch05] plus a - separate RFC for each cryptographic algorithm. - c. automatic key management -- RFCs on "The Internet Key - Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol" [Kau05] and "Cryptographic - Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 - (IKEv2)" [Sch05]. - -2. Design Objectives - -2.1. Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description - - IPsec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality, - cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6. The set of - security services offered includes access control, connectionless - integrity, data origin authentication, detection and rejection of - replays (a form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (via - encryption), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These - services are provided at the IP layer, offering protection in a - standard fashion for all protocols that may be carried over IP - (including IP itself). - - IPsec includes a specification for minimal firewall functionality, - since that is an essential aspect of access control at the IP layer. - Implementations are free to provide more sophisticated firewall - mechanisms, and to implement the IPsec-mandated functionality using - those more sophisticated mechanisms. (Note that interoperability may - suffer if additional firewall constraints on traffic flows are - imposed by an IPsec implementation but cannot be negotiated based on - the traffic selector features defined in this document and negotiated - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 5] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - via IKEv2.) The IPsec firewall function makes use of the - cryptographically-enforced authentication and integrity provided for - all IPsec traffic to offer better access control than could be - obtained through use of a firewall (one not privy to IPsec internal - parameters) plus separate cryptographic protection. - - Most of the security services are provided through use of two traffic - security protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and the - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and through the use of - cryptographic key management procedures and protocols. The set of - IPsec protocols employed in a context, and the ways in which they are - employed, will be determined by the users/administrators in that - context. It is the goal of the IPsec architecture to ensure that - compliant implementations include the services and management - interfaces needed to meet the security requirements of a broad user - population. - - When IPsec is correctly implemented and deployed, it ought not - adversely affect users, hosts, and other Internet components that do - not employ IPsec for traffic protection. IPsec security protocols - (AH and ESP, and to a lesser extent, IKE) are designed to be - cryptographic algorithm independent. This modularity permits - selection of different sets of cryptographic algorithms as - appropriate, without affecting the other parts of the implementation. - For example, different user communities may select different sets of - cryptographic algorithms (creating cryptographically-enforced - cliques) if required. - - To facilitate interoperability in the global Internet, a set of - default cryptographic algorithms for use with AH and ESP is specified - in [Eas05] and a set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms for IKEv2 - is specified in [Sch05]. [Eas05] and [Sch05] will be periodically - updated to keep pace with computational and cryptologic advances. By - specifying these algorithms in documents that are separate from the - AH, ESP, and IKEv2 specifications, these algorithms can be updated or - replaced without affecting the standardization progress of the rest - of the IPsec document suite. The use of these cryptographic - algorithms, in conjunction with IPsec traffic protection and key - management protocols, is intended to permit system and application - developers to deploy high quality, Internet-layer, cryptographic - security technology. - -2.2. Caveats and Assumptions - - The suite of IPsec protocols and associated default cryptographic - algorithms are designed to provide high quality security for Internet - traffic. However, the security offered by use of these protocols - ultimately depends on the quality of their implementation, which is - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 6] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - outside the scope of this set of standards. Moreover, the security - of a computer system or network is a function of many factors, - including personnel, physical, procedural, compromising emanations, - and computer security practices. Thus, IPsec is only one part of an - overall system security architecture. - - Finally, the security afforded by the use of IPsec is critically - dependent on many aspects of the operating environment in which the - IPsec implementation executes. For example, defects in OS security, - poor quality of random number sources, sloppy system management - protocols and practices, etc., can all degrade the security provided - by IPsec. As above, none of these environmental attributes are - within the scope of this or other IPsec standards. - -3. System Overview - - This section provides a high level description of how IPsec works, - the components of the system, and how they fit together to provide - the security services noted above. The goal of this description is - to enable the reader to "picture" the overall process/system, see how - it fits into the IP environment, and to provide context for later - sections of this document, which describe each of the components in - more detail. - - An IPsec implementation operates in a host, as a security gateway - (SG), or as an independent device, affording protection to IP - traffic. (A security gateway is an intermediate system implementing - IPsec, e.g., a firewall or router that has been IPsec-enabled.) More - detail on these classes of implementations is provided later, in - Section 3.3. The protection offered by IPsec is based on requirements - defined by a Security Policy Database (SPD) established and - maintained by a user or system administrator, or by an application - operating within constraints established by either of the above. In - general, packets are selected for one of three processing actions - based on IP and next layer header information ("Selectors", Section - 4.4.1.1) matched against entries in the SPD. Each packet is either - PROTECTed using IPsec security services, DISCARDed, or allowed to - BYPASS IPsec protection, based on the applicable SPD policies - identified by the Selectors. - -3.1. What IPsec Does - - IPsec creates a boundary between unprotected and protected - interfaces, for a host or a network (see Figure 1 below). Traffic - traversing the boundary is subject to the access controls specified - by the user or administrator responsible for the IPsec configuration. - These controls indicate whether packets cross the boundary unimpeded, - are afforded security services via AH or ESP, or are discarded. - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 7] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - IPsec security services are offered at the IP layer through selection - of appropriate security protocols, cryptographic algorithms, and - cryptographic keys. IPsec can be used to protect one or more "paths" - (a) between a pair of hosts, (b) between a pair of security gateways, - or (c) between a security gateway and a host. A compliant host - implementation MUST support (a) and (c) and a compliant security - gateway must support all three of these forms of connectivity, since - under certain circumstances a security gateway acts as a host. - - Unprotected - ^ ^ - | | - +-------------|-------|-------+ - | +-------+ | | | - | |Discard|<--| V | - | +-------+ |B +--------+ | - ................|y..| AH/ESP |..... IPsec Boundary - | +---+ |p +--------+ | - | |IKE|<----|a ^ | - | +---+ |s | | - | +-------+ |s | | - | |Discard|<--| | | - | +-------+ | | | - +-------------|-------|-------+ - | | - V V - Protected - - Figure 1. Top Level IPsec Processing Model - - In this diagram, "unprotected" refers to an interface that might also - be described as "black" or "ciphertext". Here, "protected" refers to - an interface that might also be described as "red" or "plaintext". - The protected interface noted above may be internal, e.g., in a host - implementation of IPsec, the protected interface may link to a socket - layer interface presented by the OS. In this document, the term - "inbound" refers to traffic entering an IPsec implementation via the - unprotected interface or emitted by the implementation on the - unprotected side of the boundary and directed towards the protected - interface. The term "outbound" refers to traffic entering the - implementation via the protected interface, or emitted by the - implementation on the protected side of the boundary and directed - toward the unprotected interface. An IPsec implementation may - support more than one interface on either or both sides of the - boundary. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 8] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Note the facilities for discarding traffic on either side of the - IPsec boundary, the BYPASS facility that allows traffic to transit - the boundary without cryptographic protection, and the reference to - IKE as a protected-side key and security management function. - - IPsec optionally supports negotiation of IP compression [SMPT01], - motivated in part by the observation that when encryption is employed - within IPsec, it prevents effective compression by lower protocol - layers. - -3.2. How IPsec Works - - IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security services -- - Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). - Both protocols are described in detail in their respective RFCs - [Ken05b, Ken05a]. IPsec implementations MUST support ESP and MAY - support AH. (Support for AH has been downgraded to MAY because - experience has shown that there are very few contexts in which ESP - cannot provide the requisite security services. Note that ESP can be - used to provide only integrity, without confidentiality, making it - comparable to AH in most contexts.) - - o The IP Authentication Header (AH) [Ken05b] offers integrity and - data origin authentication, with optional (at the discretion of - the receiver) anti-replay features. - - o The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol [Ken05a] offers - the same set of services, and also offers confidentiality. Use of - ESP to provide confidentiality without integrity is NOT - RECOMMENDED. When ESP is used with confidentiality enabled, there - are provisions for limited traffic flow confidentiality, i.e., - provisions for concealing packet length, and for facilitating - efficient generation and discard of dummy packets. This - capability is likely to be effective primarily in virtual private - network (VPN) and overlay network contexts. - - o Both AH and ESP offer access control, enforced through the - distribution of cryptographic keys and the management of traffic - flows as dictated by the Security Policy Database (SPD, Section - 4.4.1). - - These protocols may be applied individually or in combination with - each other to provide IPv4 and IPv6 security services. However, most - security requirements can be met through the use of ESP by itself. - Each protocol supports two modes of use: transport mode and tunnel - mode. In transport mode, AH and ESP provide protection primarily for - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 9] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - next layer protocols; in tunnel mode, AH and ESP are applied to - tunneled IP packets. The differences between the two modes are - discussed in Section 4.1. - - IPsec allows the user (or system administrator) to control the - granularity at which a security service is offered. For example, one - can create a single encrypted tunnel to carry all the traffic between - two security gateways, or a separate encrypted tunnel can be created - for each TCP connection between each pair of hosts communicating - across these gateways. IPsec, through the SPD management paradigm, - incorporates facilities for specifying: - - o which security protocol (AH or ESP) to employ, the mode (transport - or tunnel), security service options, what cryptographic - algorithms to use, and in what combinations to use the specified - protocols and services, and - - o the granularity at which protection should be applied. - - Because most of the security services provided by IPsec require the - use of cryptographic keys, IPsec relies on a separate set of - mechanisms for putting these keys in place. This document requires - support for both manual and automated distribution of keys. It - specifies a specific public-key based approach (IKEv2 [Kau05]) for - automated key management, but other automated key distribution - techniques MAY be used. - - Note: This document mandates support for several features for which - support is available in IKEv2 but not in IKEv1, e.g., negotiation of - an SA representing ranges of local and remote ports or negotiation of - multiple SAs with the same selectors. Therefore, this document - assumes use of IKEv2 or a key and security association management - system with comparable features. - -3.3. Where IPsec Can Be Implemented - - There are many ways in which IPsec may be implemented in a host, or - in conjunction with a router or firewall to create a security - gateway, or as an independent security device. - - a. IPsec may be integrated into the native IP stack. This requires - access to the IP source code and is applicable to both hosts and - security gateways, although native host implementations benefit - the most from this strategy, as explained later (Section 4.4.1, - paragraph 6; Section 4.4.1.1, last paragraph). - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 10] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - b. In a "bump-in-the-stack" (BITS) implementation, IPsec is - implemented "underneath" an existing implementation of an IP - protocol stack, between the native IP and the local network - drivers. Source code access for the IP stack is not required in - this context, making this implementation approach appropriate for - use with legacy systems. This approach, when it is adopted, is - usually employed in hosts. - - c. The use of a dedicated, inline security protocol processor is a - common design feature of systems used by the military, and of some - commercial systems as well. It is sometimes referred to as a - "bump-in-the-wire" (BITW) implementation. Such implementations - may be designed to serve either a host or a gateway. Usually, the - BITW device is itself IP addressable. When supporting a single - host, it may be quite analogous to a BITS implementation, but in - supporting a router or firewall, it must operate like a security - gateway. - - This document often talks in terms of use of IPsec by a host or a - security gateway, without regard to whether the implementation is - native, BITS, or BITW. When the distinctions among these - implementation options are significant, the document makes reference - to specific implementation approaches. - - A host implementation of IPsec may appear in devices that might not - be viewed as "hosts". For example, a router might employ IPsec to - protect routing protocols (e.g., BGP) and management functions (e.g., - Telnet), without affecting subscriber traffic traversing the router. - A security gateway might employ separate IPsec implementations to - protect its management traffic and subscriber traffic. The - architecture described in this document is very flexible. For - example, a computer with a full-featured, compliant, native OS IPsec - implementation should be capable of being configured to protect - resident (host) applications and to provide security gateway - protection for traffic traversing the computer. Such configuration - would make use of the forwarding tables and the SPD selection - function described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. - -4. Security Associations - - This section defines Security Association management requirements for - all IPv6 implementations and for those IPv4 implementations that - implement AH, ESP, or both AH and ESP. The concept of a "Security - Association" (SA) is fundamental to IPsec. Both AH and ESP make use - of SAs, and a major function of IKE is the establishment and - maintenance of SAs. All implementations of AH or ESP MUST support - the concept of an SA as described below. The remainder of this - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 11] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - section describes various aspects of SA management, defining required - characteristics for SA policy management and SA management - techniques. - -4.1. Definition and Scope - - An SA is a simplex "connection" that affords security services to the - traffic carried by it. Security services are afforded to an SA by - the use of AH, or ESP, but not both. If both AH and ESP protection - are applied to a traffic stream, then two SAs must be created and - coordinated to effect protection through iterated application of the - security protocols. To secure typical, bi-directional communication - between two IPsec-enabled systems, a pair of SAs (one in each - direction) is required. IKE explicitly creates SA pairs in - recognition of this common usage requirement. - - For an SA used to carry unicast traffic, the Security Parameters - Index (SPI) by itself suffices to specify an SA. (For information on - the SPI, see Appendix A and the AH and ESP specifications [Ken05b, - Ken05a].) However, as a local matter, an implementation may choose - to use the SPI in conjunction with the IPsec protocol type (AH or - ESP) for SA identification. If an IPsec implementation supports - multicast, then it MUST support multicast SAs using the algorithm - below for mapping inbound IPsec datagrams to SAs. Implementations - that support only unicast traffic need not implement this de- - multiplexing algorithm. - - In many secure multicast architectures, e.g., [RFC3740], a central - Group Controller/Key Server unilaterally assigns the Group Security - Association's (GSA's) SPI. This SPI assignment is not negotiated or - coordinated with the key management (e.g., IKE) subsystems that - reside in the individual end systems that constitute the group. - Consequently, it is possible that a GSA and a unicast SA can - simultaneously use the same SPI. A multicast-capable IPsec - implementation MUST correctly de-multiplex inbound traffic even in - the context of SPI collisions. - - Each entry in the SA Database (SAD) (Section 4.4.2) must indicate - whether the SA lookup makes use of the destination IP address, or the - destination and source IP addresses, in addition to the SPI. For - multicast SAs, the protocol field is not employed for SA lookups. - For each inbound, IPsec-protected packet, an implementation must - conduct its search of the SAD such that it finds the entry that - matches the "longest" SA identifier. In this context, if two or more - SAD entries match based on the SPI value, then the entry that also - matches based on destination address, or destination and source - address (as indicated in the SAD entry) is the "longest" match. This - implies a logical ordering of the SAD search as follows: - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 12] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - 1. Search the SAD for a match on the combination of SPI, - destination address, and source address. If an SAD entry - matches, then process the inbound packet with that - matching SAD entry. Otherwise, proceed to step 2. - - 2. Search the SAD for a match on both SPI and destination address. - If the SAD entry matches, then process the inbound packet - with that matching SAD entry. Otherwise, proceed to step 3. - - 3. Search the SAD for a match on only SPI if the receiver has - chosen to maintain a single SPI space for AH and ESP, and on - both SPI and protocol, otherwise. If an SAD entry matches, - then process the inbound packet with that matching SAD entry. - Otherwise, discard the packet and log an auditable event. - - In practice, an implementation may choose any method (or none at all) - to accelerate this search, although its externally visible behavior - MUST be functionally equivalent to having searched the SAD in the - above order. For example, a software-based implementation could - index into a hash table by the SPI. The SAD entries in each hash - table bucket's linked list could be kept sorted to have those SAD - entries with the longest SA identifiers first in that linked list. - Those SAD entries having the shortest SA identifiers could be sorted - so that they are the last entries in the linked list. A - hardware-based implementation may be able to effect the longest match - search intrinsically, using commonly available Ternary - Content-Addressable Memory (TCAM) features. - - The indication of whether source and destination address matching is - required to map inbound IPsec traffic to SAs MUST be set either as a - side effect of manual SA configuration or via negotiation using an SA - management protocol, e.g., IKE or Group Domain of Interpretation - (GDOI) [RFC3547]. Typically, Source-Specific Multicast (SSM) [HC03] - groups use a 3-tuple SA identifier composed of an SPI, a destination - multicast address, and source address. An Any-Source Multicast group - SA requires only an SPI and a destination multicast address as an - identifier. - - If different classes of traffic (distinguished by Differentiated - Services Code Point (DSCP) bits [NiBlBaBL98], [Gro02]) are sent on - the same SA, and if the receiver is employing the optional - anti-replay feature available in both AH and ESP, this could result - in inappropriate discarding of lower priority packets due to the - windowing mechanism used by this feature. Therefore, a sender SHOULD - put traffic of different classes, but with the same selector values, - on different SAs to support Quality of Service (QoS) appropriately. - To permit this, the IPsec implementation MUST permit establishment - and maintenance of multiple SAs between a given sender and receiver, - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 13] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - with the same selectors. Distribution of traffic among these - parallel SAs to support QoS is locally determined by the sender and - is not negotiated by IKE. The receiver MUST process the packets from - the different SAs without prejudice. These requirements apply to - both transport and tunnel mode SAs. In the case of tunnel mode SAs, - the DSCP values in question appear in the inner IP header. In - transport mode, the DSCP value might change en route, but this should - not cause problems with respect to IPsec processing since the value - is not employed for SA selection and MUST NOT be checked as part of - SA/packet validation. However, if significant re-ordering of packets - occurs in an SA, e.g., as a result of changes to DSCP values en - route, this may trigger packet discarding by a receiver due to - application of the anti-replay mechanism. - - DISCUSSION: Although the DSCP [NiBlBaBL98, Gro02] and Explicit - Congestion Notification (ECN) [RaFlBl01] fields are not "selectors", - as that term in used in this architecture, the sender will need a - mechanism to direct packets with a given (set of) DSCP values to the - appropriate SA. This mechanism might be termed a "classifier". - - As noted above, two types of SAs are defined: transport mode and - tunnel mode. IKE creates pairs of SAs, so for simplicity, we choose - to require that both SAs in a pair be of the same mode, transport or - tunnel. - - A transport mode SA is an SA typically employed between a pair of - hosts to provide end-to-end security services. When security is - desired between two intermediate systems along a path (vs. end-to-end - use of IPsec), transport mode MAY be used between security gateways - or between a security gateway and a host. In the case where - transport mode is used between security gateways or between a - security gateway and a host, transport mode may be used to support - in-IP tunneling (e.g., IP-in-IP [Per96] or Generic Routing - Encapsulation (GRE) tunneling [FaLiHaMeTr00] or dynamic routing - [ToEgWa04]) over transport mode SAs. To clarify, the use of - transport mode by an intermediate system (e.g., a security gateway) - is permitted only when applied to packets whose source address (for - outbound packets) or destination address (for inbound packets) is an - address belonging to the intermediate system itself. The access - control functions that are an important part of IPsec are - significantly limited in this context, as they cannot be applied to - the end-to-end headers of the packets that traverse a transport mode - SA used in this fashion. Thus, this way of using transport mode - should be evaluated carefully before being employed in a specific - context. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 14] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol header appears - immediately after the IP header and any options, and before any next - layer protocols (e.g., TCP or UDP). In IPv6, the security protocol - header appears after the base IP header and selected extension - headers, but may appear before or after destination options; it MUST - appear before next layer protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP, Stream Control - Transmission Protocol (SCTP)). In the case of ESP, a transport mode - SA provides security services only for these next layer protocols, - not for the IP header or any extension headers preceding the ESP - header. In the case of AH, the protection is also extended to - selected portions of the IP header preceding it, selected portions of - extension headers, and selected options (contained in the IPv4 - header, IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extension header, or IPv6 Destination - extension headers). For more details on the coverage afforded by AH, - see the AH specification [Ken05b]. - - A tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an IP tunnel, with - the access controls applied to the headers of the traffic inside the - tunnel. Two hosts MAY establish a tunnel mode SA between themselves. - Aside from the two exceptions below, whenever either end of a - security association is a security gateway, the SA MUST be tunnel - mode. Thus, an SA between two security gateways is typically a - tunnel mode SA, as is an SA between a host and a security gateway. - The two exceptions are as follows. - - o Where traffic is destined for a security gateway, e.g., Simple - Network Management Protocol (SNMP) commands, the security gateway - is acting as a host and transport mode is allowed. In this case, - the SA terminates at a host (management) function within a - security gateway and thus merits different treatment. - - o As noted above, security gateways MAY support a transport mode SA - to provide security for IP traffic between two intermediate - systems along a path, e.g., between a host and a security gateway - or between two security gateways. - - Several concerns motivate the use of tunnel mode for an SA involving - a security gateway. For example, if there are multiple paths (e.g., - via different security gateways) to the same destination behind a - security gateway, it is important that an IPsec packet be sent to the - security gateway with which the SA was negotiated. Similarly, a - packet that might be fragmented en route must have all the fragments - delivered to the same IPsec instance for reassembly prior to - cryptographic processing. Also, when a fragment is processed by - IPsec and transmitted, then fragmented en route, it is critical that - there be inner and outer headers to retain the fragmentation state - data for the pre- and post-IPsec packet formats. Hence there are - several reasons for employing tunnel mode when either end of an SA is - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 15] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - a security gateway. (Use of an IP-in-IP tunnel in conjunction with - transport mode can also address these fragmentation issues. However, - this configuration limits the ability of IPsec to enforce access - control policies on traffic.) - - Note: AH and ESP cannot be applied using transport mode to IPv4 - packets that are fragments. Only tunnel mode can be employed in such - cases. For IPv6, it would be feasible to carry a plaintext fragment - on a transport mode SA; however, for simplicity, this restriction - also applies to IPv6 packets. See Section 7 for more details on - handling plaintext fragments on the protected side of the IPsec - barrier. - - For a tunnel mode SA, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies - the IPsec processing source and destination, plus an "inner" IP - header that specifies the (apparently) ultimate source and - destination for the packet. The security protocol header appears - after the outer IP header, and before the inner IP header. If AH is - employed in tunnel mode, portions of the outer IP header are afforded - protection (as above), as well as all of the tunneled IP packet - (i.e., all of the inner IP header is protected, as well as next layer - protocols). If ESP is employed, the protection is afforded only to - the tunneled packet, not to the outer header. - - In summary, - - a) A host implementation of IPsec MUST support both transport and - tunnel mode. This is true for native, BITS, and BITW - implementations for hosts. - - b) A security gateway MUST support tunnel mode and MAY support - transport mode. If it supports transport mode, that should be - used only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g., for - network management, or to provide security between two - intermediate systems along a path. - -4.2. SA Functionality - - The set of security services offered by an SA depends on the security - protocol selected, the SA mode, the endpoints of the SA, and the - election of optional services within the protocol. - - For example, both AH and ESP offer integrity and authentication - services, but the coverage differs for each protocol and differs for - transport vs. tunnel mode. If the integrity of an IPv4 option or - IPv6 extension header must be protected en route between sender and - receiver, AH can provide this service, except for IP or extension - headers that may change in a fashion not predictable by the sender. - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 16] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - However, the same security may be achieved in some contexts by - applying ESP to a tunnel carrying a packet. - - The granularity of access control provided is determined by the - choice of the selectors that define each SA. Moreover, the - authentication means employed by IPsec peers, e.g., during creation - of an IKE (vs. child) SA also affects the granularity of the access - control afforded. - - If confidentiality is selected, then an ESP (tunnel mode) SA between - two security gateways can offer partial traffic flow confidentiality. - The use of tunnel mode allows the inner IP headers to be encrypted, - concealing the identities of the (ultimate) traffic source and - destination. Moreover, ESP payload padding also can be invoked to - hide the size of the packets, further concealing the external - characteristics of the traffic. Similar traffic flow confidentiality - services may be offered when a mobile user is assigned a dynamic IP - address in a dialup context, and establishes a (tunnel mode) ESP SA - to a corporate firewall (acting as a security gateway). Note that - fine-granularity SAs generally are more vulnerable to traffic - analysis than coarse-granularity ones that are carrying traffic from - many subscribers. - - Note: A compliant implementation MUST NOT allow instantiation of an - ESP SA that employs both NULL encryption and no integrity algorithm. - An attempt to negotiate such an SA is an auditable event by both - initiator and responder. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD - include the current date/time, local IKE IP address, and remote IKE - IP address. The initiator SHOULD record the relevant SPD entry. - -4.3. Combining SAs - - This document does not require support for nested security - associations or for what RFC 2401 [RFC2401] called "SA bundles". - These features still can be effected by appropriate configuration of - both the SPD and the local forwarding functions (for inbound and - outbound traffic), but this capability is outside of the IPsec module - and thus the scope of this specification. As a result, management of - nested/bundled SAs is potentially more complex and less assured than - under the model implied by RFC 2401 [RFC2401]. An implementation - that provides support for nested SAs SHOULD provide a management - interface that enables a user or administrator to express the nesting - requirement, and then create the appropriate SPD entries and - forwarding table entries to effect the requisite processing. (See - Appendix E for an example of how to configure nested SAs.) - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 17] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -4.4. Major IPsec Databases - - Many of the details associated with processing IP traffic in an IPsec - implementation are largely a local matter, not subject to - standardization. However, some external aspects of the processing - must be standardized to ensure interoperability and to provide a - minimum management capability that is essential for productive use of - IPsec. This section describes a general model for processing IP - traffic relative to IPsec functionality, in support of these - interoperability and functionality goals. The model described below - is nominal; implementations need not match details of this model as - presented, but the external behavior of implementations MUST - correspond to the externally observable characteristics of this model - in order to be compliant. - - There are three nominal databases in this model: the Security Policy - Database (SPD), the Security Association Database (SAD), and the Peer - Authorization Database (PAD). The first specifies the policies that - determine the disposition of all IP traffic inbound or outbound from - a host or security gateway (Section 4.4.1). The second database - contains parameters that are associated with each established (keyed) - SA (Section 4.4.2). The third database, the PAD, provides a link - between an SA management protocol (such as IKE) and the SPD (Section - 4.4.3). - - Multiple Separate IPsec Contexts - - If an IPsec implementation acts as a security gateway for multiple - subscribers, it MAY implement multiple separate IPsec contexts. - Each context MAY have and MAY use completely independent - identities, policies, key management SAs, and/or IPsec SAs. This - is for the most part a local implementation matter. However, a - means for associating inbound (SA) proposals with local contexts - is required. To this end, if supported by the key management - protocol in use, context identifiers MAY be conveyed from - initiator to responder in the signaling messages, with the result - that IPsec SAs are created with a binding to a particular context. - For example, a security gateway that provides VPN service to - multiple customers will be able to associate each customer's - traffic with the correct VPN. - - Forwarding vs Security Decisions - - The IPsec model described here embodies a clear separation between - forwarding (routing) and security decisions, to accommodate a wide - range of contexts where IPsec may be employed. Forwarding may be - trivial, in the case where there are only two interfaces, or it - may be complex, e.g., if the context in which IPsec is implemented - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 18] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - employs a sophisticated forwarding function. IPsec assumes only - that outbound and inbound traffic that has passed through IPsec - processing is forwarded in a fashion consistent with the context - in which IPsec is implemented. Support for nested SAs is - optional; if required, it requires coordination between forwarding - tables and SPD entries to cause a packet to traverse the IPsec - boundary more than once. - - "Local" vs "Remote" - - In this document, with respect to IP addresses and ports, the - terms "Local" and "Remote" are used for policy rules. "Local" - refers to the entity being protected by an IPsec implementation, - i.e., the "source" address/port of outbound packets or the - "destination" address/port of inbound packets. "Remote" refers to - a peer entity or peer entities. The terms "source" and - "destination" are used for packet header fields. - - "Non-initial" vs "Initial" Fragments - - Throughout this document, the phrase "non-initial fragments" is - used to mean fragments that do not contain all of the selector - values that may be needed for access control (e.g., they might not - contain Next Layer Protocol, source and destination ports, ICMP - message type/code, Mobility Header type). And the phrase "initial - fragment" is used to mean a fragment that contains all the - selector values needed for access control. However, it should be - noted that for IPv6, which fragment contains the Next Layer - Protocol and ports (or ICMP message type/code or Mobility Header - type [Mobip]) will depend on the kind and number of extension - headers present. The "initial fragment" might not be the first - fragment, in this context. - -4.4.1. The Security Policy Database (SPD) - - An SA is a management construct used to enforce security policy for - traffic crossing the IPsec boundary. Thus, an essential element of - SA processing is an underlying Security Policy Database (SPD) that - specifies what services are to be offered to IP datagrams and in what - fashion. The form of the database and its interface are outside the - scope of this specification. However, this section specifies minimum - management functionality that must be provided, to allow a user or - system administrator to control whether and how IPsec is applied to - traffic transmitted or received by a host or transiting a security - gateway. The SPD, or relevant caches, must be consulted during the - processing of all traffic (inbound and outbound), including traffic - not protected by IPsec, that traverses the IPsec boundary. This - includes IPsec management traffic such as IKE. An IPsec - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 19] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - implementation MUST have at least one SPD, and it MAY support - multiple SPDs, if appropriate for the context in which the IPsec - implementation operates. There is no requirement to maintain SPDs on - a per-interface basis, as was specified in RFC 2401 [RFC2401]. - However, if an implementation supports multiple SPDs, then it MUST - include an explicit SPD selection function that is invoked to select - the appropriate SPD for outbound traffic processing. The inputs to - this function are the outbound packet and any local metadata (e.g., - the interface via which the packet arrived) required to effect the - SPD selection function. The output of the function is an SPD - identifier (SPD-ID). - - The SPD is an ordered database, consistent with the use of Access - Control Lists (ACLs) or packet filters in firewalls, routers, etc. - The ordering requirement arises because entries often will overlap - due to the presence of (non-trivial) ranges as values for selectors. - Thus, a user or administrator MUST be able to order the entries to - express a desired access control policy. There is no way to impose a - general, canonical order on SPD entries, because of the allowed use - of wildcards for selector values and because the different types of - selectors are not hierarchically related. - - Processing Choices: DISCARD, BYPASS, PROTECT - - An SPD must discriminate among traffic that is afforded IPsec - protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec. This - applies to the IPsec protection to be applied by a sender and to - the IPsec protection that must be present at the receiver. For - any outbound or inbound datagram, three processing choices are - possible: DISCARD, BYPASS IPsec, or PROTECT using IPsec. The - first choice refers to traffic that is not allowed to traverse the - IPsec boundary (in the specified direction). The second choice - refers to traffic that is allowed to cross the IPsec boundary - without IPsec protection. The third choice refers to traffic that - is afforded IPsec protection, and for such traffic the SPD must - specify the security protocols to be employed, their mode, - security service options, and the cryptographic algorithms to be - used. - - SPD-S, SPD-I, SPD-O - - An SPD is logically divided into three pieces. The SPD-S (secure - traffic) contains entries for all traffic subject to IPsec - protection. SPD-O (outbound) contains entries for all outbound - traffic that is to be bypassed or discarded. SPD-I (inbound) is - applied to inbound traffic that will be bypassed or discarded. - All three of these can be decorrelated (with the exception noted - above for native host implementations) to facilitate caching. If - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 20] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - an IPsec implementation supports only one SPD, then the SPD - consists of all three parts. If multiple SPDs are supported, some - of them may be partial, e.g., some SPDs might contain only SPD-I - entries, to control inbound bypassed traffic on a per-interface - basis. The split allows SPD-I to be consulted without having to - consult SPD-S, for such traffic. Since the SPD-I is just a part - of the SPD, if a packet that is looked up in the SPD-I cannot be - matched to an entry there, then the packet MUST be discarded. - Note that for outbound traffic, if a match is not found in SPD-S, - then SPD-O must be checked to see if the traffic should be - bypassed. Similarly, if SPD-O is checked first and no match is - found, then SPD-S must be checked. In an ordered, - non-decorrelated SPD, the entries for the SPD-S, SPD-I, and SPD-O - are interleaved. So there is one lookup in the SPD. - - SPD Entries - - Each SPD entry specifies packet disposition as BYPASS, DISCARD, or - PROTECT. The entry is keyed by a list of one or more selectors. - The SPD contains an ordered list of these entries. The required - selector types are defined in Section 4.4.1.1. These selectors are - used to define the granularity of the SAs that are created in - response to an outbound packet or in response to a proposal from a - peer. The detailed structure of an SPD entry is described in - Section 4.4.1.2. Every SPD SHOULD have a nominal, final entry that - matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it. - - The SPD MUST permit a user or administrator to specify policy - entries as follows: - - - SPD-I: For inbound traffic that is to be bypassed or discarded, - the entry consists of the values of the selectors that apply to - the traffic to be bypassed or discarded. - - - SPD-O: For outbound traffic that is to be bypassed or - discarded, the entry consists of the values of the selectors - that apply to the traffic to be bypassed or discarded. - - - SPD-S: For traffic that is to be protected using IPsec, the - entry consists of the values of the selectors that apply to the - traffic to be protected via AH or ESP, controls on how to - create SAs based on these selectors, and the parameters needed - to effect this protection (e.g., algorithms, modes, etc.). Note - that an SPD-S entry also contains information such as "populate - from packet" (PFP) flag (see paragraphs below on "How To Derive - the Values for an SAD entry") and bits indicating whether the - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 21] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - SA lookup makes use of the local and remote IP addresses in - addition to the SPI (see AH [Ken05b] or ESP [Ken05a] - specifications). - - Representing Directionality in an SPD Entry - - For traffic protected by IPsec, the Local and Remote address and - ports in an SPD entry are swapped to represent directionality, - consistent with IKE conventions. In general, the protocols that - IPsec deals with have the property of requiring symmetric SAs with - flipped Local/Remote IP addresses. However, for ICMP, there is - often no such bi-directional authorization requirement. - Nonetheless, for the sake of uniformity and simplicity, SPD - entries for ICMP are specified in the same way as for other - protocols. Note also that for ICMP, Mobility Header, and - non-initial fragments, there are no port fields in these packets. - ICMP has message type and code and Mobility Header has mobility - header type. Thus, SPD entries have provisions for expressing - access controls appropriate for these protocols, in lieu of the - normal port field controls. For bypassed or discarded traffic, - separate inbound and outbound entries are supported, e.g., to - permit unidirectional flows if required. - - OPAQUE and ANY - - For each selector in an SPD entry, in addition to the literal - values that define a match, there are two special values: ANY and - OPAQUE. ANY is a wildcard that matches any value in the - corresponding field of the packet, or that matches packets where - that field is not present or is obscured. OPAQUE indicates that - the corresponding selector field is not available for examination - because it may not be present in a fragment, it does not exist for - the given Next Layer Protocol, or prior application of IPsec may - have encrypted the value. The ANY value encompasses the OPAQUE - value. Thus, OPAQUE need be used only when it is necessary to - distinguish between the case of any allowed value for a field, vs. - the absence or unavailability (e.g., due to encryption) of the - field. - - How to Derive the Values for an SAD Entry - - For each selector in an SPD entry, the entry specifies how to - derive the corresponding values for a new SA Database (SAD, see - Section 4.4.2) entry from those in the SPD and the packet. The - goal is to allow an SAD entry and an SPD cache entry to be created - based on specific selector values from the packet, or from the - matching SPD entry. For outbound traffic, there are SPD-S cache - entries and SPD-O cache entries. For inbound traffic not - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 22] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - protected by IPsec, there are SPD-I cache entries and there is the - SAD, which represents the cache for inbound IPsec-protected - traffic (see Section 4.4.2). If IPsec processing is specified for - an entry, a "populate from packet" (PFP) flag may be asserted for - one or more of the selectors in the SPD entry (Local IP address; - Remote IP address; Next Layer Protocol; and, depending on Next - Layer Protocol, Local port and Remote port, or ICMP type/code, or - Mobility Header type). If asserted for a given selector X, the - flag indicates that the SA to be created should take its value for - X from the value in the packet. Otherwise, the SA should take its - value(s) for X from the value(s) in the SPD entry. Note: In the - non-PFP case, the selector values negotiated by the SA management - protocol (e.g., IKEv2) may be a subset of those in the SPD entry, - depending on the SPD policy of the peer. Also, whether a single - flag is used for, e.g., source port, ICMP type/code, and Mobility - Header (MH) type, or a separate flag is used for each, is a local - matter. - - The following example illustrates the use of the PFP flag in the - context of a security gateway or a BITS/BITW implementation. - Consider an SPD entry where the allowed value for Remote address - is a range of IPv4 addresses: 192.0.2.1 to 192.0.2.10. Suppose an - outbound packet arrives with a destination address of 192.0.2.3, - and there is no extant SA to carry this packet. The value used - for the SA created to transmit this packet could be either of the - two values shown below, depending on what the SPD entry for this - selector says is the source of the selector value: - - PFP flag value example of new - for the Remote SAD dest. address - addr. selector selector value - --------------- ------------ - a. PFP TRUE 192.0.2.3 (one host) - b. PFP FALSE 192.0.2.1 to 192.0.2.10 (range of hosts) - - Note that if the SPD entry above had a value of ANY for the Remote - address, then the SAD selector value would have to be ANY for case - (b), but would still be as illustrated for case (a). Thus, the - PFP flag can be used to prohibit sharing of an SA, even among - packets that match the same SPD entry. - - Management Interface - - For every IPsec implementation, there MUST be a management - interface that allows a user or system administrator to manage the - SPD. The interface must allow the user (or administrator) to - specify the security processing to be applied to every packet that - traverses the IPsec boundary. (In a native host IPsec - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 23] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - implementation making use of a socket interface, the SPD may not - need to be consulted on a per-packet basis, as noted at the end of - Section 4.4.1.1 and in Section 5.) The management interface for - the SPD MUST allow creation of entries consistent with the - selectors defined in Section 4.4.1.1, and MUST support (total) - ordering of these entries, as seen via this interface. The SPD - entries' selectors are analogous to the ACL or packet filters - commonly found in a stateless firewall or packet filtering router - and which are currently managed this way. - - In host systems, applications MAY be allowed to create SPD - entries. (The means of signaling such requests to the IPsec - implementation are outside the scope of this standard.) However, - the system administrator MUST be able to specify whether or not a - user or application can override (default) system policies. The - form of the management interface is not specified by this document - and may differ for hosts vs. security gateways, and within hosts - the interface may differ for socket-based vs. BITS - implementations. However, this document does specify a standard - set of SPD elements that all IPsec implementations MUST support. - - Decorrelation - - The processing model described in this document assumes the - ability to decorrelate overlapping SPD entries to permit caching, - which enables more efficient processing of outbound traffic in - security gateways and BITS/BITW implementations. Decorrelation - [CoSa04] is only a means of improving performance and simplifying - the processing description. This RFC does not require a compliant - implementation to make use of decorrelation. For example, native - host implementations typically make use of caching implicitly - because they bind SAs to socket interfaces, and thus there is no - requirement to be able to decorrelate SPD entries in these - implementations. - - Note: Unless otherwise qualified, the use of "SPD" refers to the - body of policy information in both ordered or decorrelated - (unordered) state. Appendix B provides an algorithm that can be - used to decorrelate SPD entries, but any algorithm that produces - equivalent output may be used. Note that when an SPD entry is - decorrelated all the resulting entries MUST be linked together, so - that all members of the group derived from an individual, SPD - entry (prior to decorrelation) can all be placed into caches and - into the SAD at the same time. For example, suppose one starts - with an entry A (from an ordered SPD) that when decorrelated, - yields entries A1, A2, and A3. When a packet comes along that - matches, say A2, and triggers the creation of an SA, the SA - management protocol (e.g., IKEv2) negotiates A. And all 3 - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 24] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - decorrelated entries, A1, A2, and A3, are placed in the - appropriate SPD-S cache and linked to the SA. The intent is that - use of a decorrelated SPD ought not to create more SAs than would - have resulted from use of a not-decorrelated SPD. - - If a decorrelated SPD is employed, there are three options for - what an initiator sends to a peer via an SA management protocol - (e.g., IKE). By sending the complete set of linked, decorrelated - entries that were selected from the SPD, a peer is given the best - possible information to enable selection of the appropriate SPD - entry at its end, especially if the peer has also decorrelated its - SPD. However, if a large number of decorrelated entries are - linked, this may create large packets for SA negotiation, and - hence fragmentation problems for the SA management protocol. - - Alternatively, the original entry from the (correlated) SPD may be - retained and passed to the SA management protocol. Passing the - correlated SPD entry keeps the use of a decorrelated SPD a local - matter, not visible to peers, and avoids possible fragmentation - concerns, although it provides less precise information to a - responder for matching against the responder's SPD. - - An intermediate approach is to send a subset of the complete set - of linked, decorrelated SPD entries. This approach can avoid the - fragmentation problems cited above yet provide better information - than the original, correlated entry. The major shortcoming of - this approach is that it may cause additional SAs to be created - later, since only a subset of the linked, decorrelated entries are - sent to a peer. Implementers are free to employ any of the - approaches cited above. - - A responder uses the traffic selector proposals it receives via an - SA management protocol to select an appropriate entry in its SPD. - The intent of the matching is to select an SPD entry and create an - SA that most closely matches the intent of the initiator, so that - traffic traversing the resulting SA will be accepted at both ends. - If the responder employs a decorrelated SPD, it SHOULD use the - decorrelated SPD entries for matching, as this will generally - result in creation of SAs that are more likely to match the intent - of both peers. If the responder has a correlated SPD, then it - SHOULD match the proposals against the correlated entries. For - IKEv2, use of a decorrelated SPD offers the best opportunity for a - responder to generate a "narrowed" response. - - In all cases, when a decorrelated SPD is available, the - decorrelated entries are used to populate the SPD-S cache. If the - SPD is not decorrelated, caching is not allowed and an ordered - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 25] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - search of SPD MUST be performed to verify that inbound traffic - arriving on an SA is consistent with the access control policy - expressed in the SPD. - - Handling Changes to the SPD While the System Is Running - - If a change is made to the SPD while the system is running, a - check SHOULD be made of the effect of this change on extant SAs. - An implementation SHOULD check the impact of an SPD change on - extant SAs and SHOULD provide a user/administrator with a - mechanism for configuring what actions to take, e.g., delete an - affected SA, allow an affected SA to continue unchanged, etc. - -4.4.1.1. Selectors - - An SA may be fine-grained or coarse-grained, depending on the - selectors used to define the set of traffic for the SA. For example, - all traffic between two hosts may be carried via a single SA, and - afforded a uniform set of security services. Alternatively, traffic - between a pair of hosts might be spread over multiple SAs, depending - on the applications being used (as defined by the Next Layer Protocol - and related fields, e.g., ports), with different security services - offered by different SAs. Similarly, all traffic between a pair of - security gateways could be carried on a single SA, or one SA could be - assigned for each communicating host pair. The following selector - parameters MUST be supported by all IPsec implementations to - facilitate control of SA granularity. Note that both Local and - Remote addresses should either be IPv4 or IPv6, but not a mix of - address types. Also, note that the Local/Remote port selectors (and - ICMP message type and code, and Mobility Header type) may be labeled - as OPAQUE to accommodate situations where these fields are - inaccessible due to packet fragmentation. - - - Remote IP Address(es) (IPv4 or IPv6): This is a list of ranges - of IP addresses (unicast, broadcast (IPv4 only)). This - structure allows expression of a single IP address (via a - trivial range), or a list of addresses (each a trivial range), - or a range of addresses (low and high values, inclusive), as - well as the most generic form of a list of ranges. Address - ranges are used to support more than one remote system sharing - the same SA, e.g., behind a security gateway. - - - Local IP Address(es) (IPv4 or IPv6): This is a list of ranges of - IP addresses (unicast, broadcast (IPv4 only)). This structure - allows expression of a single IP address (via a trivial range), - or a list of addresses (each a trivial range), or a range of - addresses (low and high values, inclusive), as well as the most - generic form of a list of ranges. Address ranges are used to - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 26] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - support more than one source system sharing the same SA, e.g., - behind a security gateway. Local refers to the address(es) - being protected by this implementation (or policy entry). - - Note: The SPD does not include support for multicast address - entries. To support multicast SAs, an implementation should - make use of a Group SPD (GSPD) as defined in [RFC3740]. GSPD - entries require a different structure, i.e., one cannot use the - symmetric relationship associated with local and remote address - values for unicast SAs in a multicast context. Specifically, - outbound traffic directed to a multicast address on an SA would - not be received on a companion, inbound SA with the multicast - address as the source. - - - Next Layer Protocol: Obtained from the IPv4 "Protocol" or the - IPv6 "Next Header" fields. This is an individual protocol - number, ANY, or for IPv6 only, OPAQUE. The Next Layer Protocol - is whatever comes after any IP extension headers that are - present. To simplify locating the Next Layer Protocol, there - SHOULD be a mechanism for configuring which IPv6 extension - headers to skip. The default configuration for which protocols - to skip SHOULD include the following protocols: 0 (Hop-by-hop - options), 43 (Routing Header), 44 (Fragmentation Header), and 60 - (Destination Options). Note: The default list does NOT include - 51 (AH) or 50 (ESP). From a selector lookup point of view, - IPsec treats AH and ESP as Next Layer Protocols. - - Several additional selectors depend on the Next Layer Protocol - value: - - * If the Next Layer Protocol uses two ports (as do TCP, UDP, - SCTP, and others), then there are selectors for Local and - Remote Ports. Each of these selectors has a list of ranges - of values. Note that the Local and Remote ports may not be - available in the case of receipt of a fragmented packet or if - the port fields have been protected by IPsec (encrypted); - thus, a value of OPAQUE also MUST be supported. Note: In a - non-initial fragment, port values will not be available. If - a port selector specifies a value other than ANY or OPAQUE, - it cannot match packets that are non-initial fragments. If - the SA requires a port value other than ANY or OPAQUE, an - arriving fragment without ports MUST be discarded. (See - Section 7, "Handling Fragments".) - - * If the Next Layer Protocol is a Mobility Header, then there - is a selector for IPv6 Mobility Header message type (MH type) - [Mobip]. This is an 8-bit value that identifies a particular - mobility message. Note that the MH type may not be available - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 27] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - in the case of receipt of a fragmented packet. (See Section - 7, "Handling Fragments".) For IKE, the IPv6 Mobility Header - message type (MH type) is placed in the most significant - eight bits of the 16-bit local "port" selector. - - * If the Next Layer Protocol value is ICMP, then there is a - 16-bit selector for the ICMP message type and code. The - message type is a single 8-bit value, which defines the type - of an ICMP message, or ANY. The ICMP code is a single 8-bit - value that defines a specific subtype for an ICMP message. - For IKE, the message type is placed in the most significant 8 - bits of the 16-bit selector and the code is placed in the - least significant 8 bits. This 16-bit selector can contain a - single type and a range of codes, a single type and ANY code, - and ANY type and ANY code. Given a policy entry with a range - of Types (T-start to T-end) and a range of Codes (C-start to - C-end), and an ICMP packet with Type t and Code c, an - implementation MUST test for a match using - - (T-start*256) + C-start <= (t*256) + c <= (T-end*256) + - C-end - - Note that the ICMP message type and code may not be available - in the case of receipt of a fragmented packet. (See Section - 7, "Handling Fragments".) - - - Name: This is not a selector like the others above. It is not - acquired from a packet. A name may be used as a symbolic - identifier for an IPsec Local or Remote address. Named SPD - entries are used in two ways: - - 1. A named SPD entry is used by a responder (not an initiator) - in support of access control when an IP address would not be - appropriate for the Remote IP address selector, e.g., for - "road warriors". The name used to match this field is - communicated during the IKE negotiation in the ID payload. - In this context, the initiator's Source IP address (inner IP - header in tunnel mode) is bound to the Remote IP address in - the SAD entry created by the IKE negotiation. This address - overrides the Remote IP address value in the SPD, when the - SPD entry is selected in this fashion. All IPsec - implementations MUST support this use of names. - - 2. A named SPD entry may be used by an initiator to identify a - user for whom an IPsec SA will be created (or for whom - traffic may be bypassed). The initiator's IP source address - (from inner IP header in tunnel mode) is used to replace the - following if and when they are created: - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 28] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - - local address in the SPD cache entry - - local address in the outbound SAD entry - - remote address in the inbound SAD entry - - Support for this use is optional for multi-user, native host - implementations and not applicable to other implementations. - Note that this name is used only locally; it is not - communicated by the key management protocol. Also, name - forms other than those used for case 1 above (responder) are - applicable in the initiator context (see below). - - An SPD entry can contain both a name (or a list of names) and - also values for the Local or Remote IP address. - - For case 1, responder, the identifiers employed in named SPD - entries are one of the following four types: - - a. a fully qualified user name string (email), e.g., - mozart@foo.example.com - (this corresponds to ID_RFC822_ADDR in IKEv2) - - b. a fully qualified DNS name, e.g., - foo.example.com - (this corresponds to ID_FQDN in IKEv2) - - c. X.500 distinguished name, e.g., [WaKiHo97], - CN = Stephen T. Kent, O = BBN Technologies, - SP = MA, C = US - (this corresponds to ID_DER_ASN1_DN in IKEv2, after - decoding) - - d. a byte string - (this corresponds to Key_ID in IKEv2) - - For case 2, initiator, the identifiers employed in named SPD - entries are of type byte string. They are likely to be Unix - UIDs, Windows security IDs, or something similar, but could - also be a user name or account name. In all cases, this - identifier is only of local concern and is not transmitted. - - The IPsec implementation context determines how selectors are used. - For example, a native host implementation typically makes use of a - socket interface. When a new connection is established, the SPD can - be consulted and an SA bound to the socket. Thus, traffic sent via - that socket need not result in additional lookups to the SPD (SPD-O - and SPD-S) cache. In contrast, a BITS, BITW, or security gateway - implementation needs to look at each packet and perform an - SPD-O/SPD-S cache lookup based on the selectors. - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 29] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -4.4.1.2. Structure of an SPD Entry - - This section contains a prose description of an SPD entry. Also, - Appendix C provides an example of an ASN.1 definition of an SPD - entry. - - This text describes the SPD in a fashion that is intended to map - directly into IKE payloads to ensure that the policy required by SPD - entries can be negotiated through IKE. Unfortunately, the semantics - of the version of IKEv2 published concurrently with this document - [Kau05] do not align precisely with those defined for the SPD. - Specifically, IKEv2 does not enable negotiation of a single SA that - binds multiple pairs of local and remote addresses and ports to a - single SA. Instead, when multiple local and remote addresses and - ports are negotiated for an SA, IKEv2 treats these not as pairs, but - as (unordered) sets of local and remote values that can be - arbitrarily paired. Until IKE provides a facility that conveys the - semantics that are expressed in the SPD via selector sets (as - described below), users MUST NOT include multiple selector sets in a - single SPD entry unless the access control intent aligns with the IKE - "mix and match" semantics. An implementation MAY warn users, to - alert them to this problem if users create SPD entries with multiple - selector sets, the syntax of which indicates possible conflicts with - current IKE semantics. - - The management GUI can offer the user other forms of data entry and - display, e.g., the option of using address prefixes as well as - ranges, and symbolic names for protocols, ports, etc. (Do not confuse - the use of symbolic names in a management interface with the SPD - selector "Name".) Note that Remote/Local apply only to IP addresses - and ports, not to ICMP message type/code or Mobility Header type. - Also, if the reserved, symbolic selector value OPAQUE or ANY is - employed for a given selector type, only that value may appear in the - list for that selector, and it must appear only once in the list for - that selector. Note that ANY and OPAQUE are local syntax conventions - -- IKEv2 negotiates these values via the ranges indicated below: - - ANY: start = 0 end = <max> - OPAQUE: start = <max> end = 0 - - An SPD is an ordered list of entries each of which contains the - following fields. - - o Name -- a list of IDs. This quasi-selector is optional. - The forms that MUST be supported are described above in - Section 4.4.1.1 under "Name". - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 30] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - o PFP flags -- one per traffic selector. A given flag, e.g., - for Next Layer Protocol, applies to the relevant selector - across all "selector sets" (see below) contained in an SPD - entry. When creating an SA, each flag specifies for the - corresponding traffic selector whether to instantiate the - selector from the corresponding field in the packet that - triggered the creation of the SA or from the value(s) in - the corresponding SPD entry (see Section 4.4.1, "How to - Derive the Values for an SAD Entry"). Whether a single - flag is used for, e.g., source port, ICMP type/code, and - MH type, or a separate flag is used for each, is a local - matter. There are PFP flags for: - - Local Address - - Remote Address - - Next Layer Protocol - - Local Port, or ICMP message type/code or Mobility - Header type (depending on the next layer protocol) - - Remote Port, or ICMP message type/code or Mobility - Header type (depending on the next layer protocol) - - o One to N selector sets that correspond to the "condition" - for applying a particular IPsec action. Each selector set - contains: - - Local Address - - Remote Address - - Next Layer Protocol - - Local Port, or ICMP message type/code or Mobility - Header type (depending on the next layer protocol) - - Remote Port, or ICMP message type/code or Mobility - Header type (depending on the next layer protocol) - - Note: The "next protocol" selector is an individual value - (unlike the local and remote IP addresses) in a selector - set entry. This is consistent with how IKEv2 negotiates - the Traffic Selector (TS) values for an SA. It also makes - sense because one may need to associate different port - fields with different protocols. It is possible to - associate multiple protocols (and ports) with a single SA - by specifying multiple selector sets for that SA. - - o Processing info -- which action is required -- PROTECT, - BYPASS, or DISCARD. There is just one action that goes - with all the selector sets, not a separate action for each - set. If the required processing is PROTECT, the entry - contains the following information. - - IPsec mode -- tunnel or transport - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 31] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - - (if tunnel mode) local tunnel address -- For a - non-mobile host, if there is just one interface, this - is straightforward; if there are multiple - interfaces, this must be statically configured. For a - mobile host, the specification of the local address - is handled externally to IPsec. - - (if tunnel mode) remote tunnel address -- There is no - standard way to determine this. See 4.5.3, "Locating - a Security Gateway". - - Extended Sequence Number -- Is this SA using extended - sequence numbers? - - stateful fragment checking -- Is this SA using - stateful fragment checking? (See Section 7 for more - details.) - - Bypass DF bit (T/F) -- applicable to tunnel mode SAs - - Bypass DSCP (T/F) or map to unprotected DSCP values - (array) if needed to restrict bypass of DSCP values -- - applicable to tunnel mode SAs - - IPsec protocol -- AH or ESP - - algorithms -- which ones to use for AH, which ones to - use for ESP, which ones to use for combined mode, - ordered by decreasing priority - - It is a local matter as to what information is kept with regard to - handling extant SAs when the SPD is changed. - -4.4.1.3. More Regarding Fields Associated with Next Layer Protocols - - Additional selectors are often associated with fields in the Next - Layer Protocol header. A particular Next Layer Protocol can have - zero, one, or two selectors. There may be situations where there - aren't both local and remote selectors for the fields that are - dependent on the Next Layer Protocol. The IPv6 Mobility Header has - only a Mobility Header message type. AH and ESP have no further - selector fields. A system may be willing to send an ICMP message - type and code that it does not want to receive. In the descriptions - below, "port" is used to mean a field that is dependent on the Next - Layer Protocol. - - A. If a Next Layer Protocol has no "port" selectors, then - the Local and Remote "port" selectors are set to OPAQUE in - the relevant SPD entry, e.g., - - Local's - next layer protocol = AH - "port" selector = OPAQUE - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 32] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Remote's - next layer protocol = AH - "port" selector = OPAQUE - - B. Even if a Next Layer Protocol has only one selector, e.g., - Mobility Header type, then the Local and Remote "port" - selectors are used to indicate whether a system is - willing to send and/or receive traffic with the specified - "port" values. For example, if Mobility Headers of a - specified type are allowed to be sent and received via an - SA, then the relevant SPD entry would be set as follows: - - Local's - next layer protocol = Mobility Header - "port" selector = Mobility Header message type - - Remote's - next layer protocol = Mobility Header - "port" selector = Mobility Header message type - - If Mobility Headers of a specified type are allowed to be - sent but NOT received via an SA, then the relevant SPD - entry would be set as follows: - - Local's - next layer protocol = Mobility Header - "port" selector = Mobility Header message type - - Remote's - next layer protocol = Mobility Header - "port" selector = OPAQUE - - If Mobility Headers of a specified type are allowed to be - received but NOT sent via an SA, then the relevant SPD - entry would be set as follows: - - Local's - next layer protocol = Mobility Header - "port" selector = OPAQUE - - Remote's - next layer protocol = Mobility Header - "port" selector = Mobility Header message type - - C. If a system is willing to send traffic with a particular - "port" value but NOT receive traffic with that kind of - port value, the system's traffic selectors are set as - follows in the relevant SPD entry: - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 33] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Local's - next layer protocol = ICMP - "port" selector = <specific ICMP type & code> - - Remote's - next layer protocol = ICMP - "port" selector = OPAQUE - - D. To indicate that a system is willing to receive traffic - with a particular "port" value but NOT send that kind of - traffic, the system's traffic selectors are set as follows - in the relevant SPD entry: - - Local's - next layer protocol = ICMP - "port" selector = OPAQUE - - Remote's - next layer protocol = ICMP - "port" selector = <specific ICMP type & code> - - For example, if a security gateway is willing to allow - systems behind it to send ICMP traceroutes, but is not - willing to let outside systems run ICMP traceroutes to - systems behind it, then the security gateway's traffic - selectors are set as follows in the relevant SPD entry: - - Local's - next layer protocol = 1 (ICMPv4) - "port" selector = 30 (traceroute) - - Remote's - next layer protocol = 1 (ICMPv4) - "port" selector = OPAQUE - -4.4.2. Security Association Database (SAD) - - In each IPsec implementation, there is a nominal Security Association - Database (SAD), in which each entry defines the parameters associated - with one SA. Each SA has an entry in the SAD. For outbound - processing, each SAD entry is pointed to by entries in the SPD-S part - of the SPD cache. For inbound processing, for unicast SAs, the SPI - is used either alone to look up an SA or in conjunction with the - IPsec protocol type. If an IPsec implementation supports multicast, - the SPI plus destination address, or SPI plus destination and source - addresses are used to look up the SA. (See Section 4.1 for details on - the algorithm that MUST be used for mapping inbound IPsec datagrams - to SAs.) The following parameters are associated with each entry in - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 34] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - the SAD. They should all be present except where otherwise noted, - e.g., AH Authentication algorithm. This description does not purport - to be a MIB, only a specification of the minimal data items required - to support an SA in an IPsec implementation. - - For each of the selectors defined in Section 4.4.1.1, the entry for - an inbound SA in the SAD MUST be initially populated with the value - or values negotiated at the time the SA was created. (See the - paragraph in Section 4.4.1 under "Handling Changes to the SPD while - the System is Running" for guidance on the effect of SPD changes on - extant SAs.) For a receiver, these values are used to check that the - header fields of an inbound packet (after IPsec processing) match the - selector values negotiated for the SA. Thus, the SAD acts as a cache - for checking the selectors of inbound traffic arriving on SAs. For - the receiver, this is part of verifying that a packet arriving on an - SA is consistent with the policy for the SA. (See Section 6 for rules - for ICMP messages.) These fields can have the form of specific - values, ranges, ANY, or OPAQUE, as described in Section 4.4.1.1, - "Selectors". Note also that there are a couple of situations in - which the SAD can have entries for SAs that do not have corresponding - entries in the SPD. Since this document does not mandate that the - SAD be selectively cleared when the SPD is changed, SAD entries can - remain when the SPD entries that created them are changed or deleted. - Also, if a manually keyed SA is created, there could be an SAD entry - for this SA that does not correspond to any SPD entry. - - Note: The SAD can support multicast SAs, if manually configured. An - outbound multicast SA has the same structure as a unicast SA. The - source address is that of the sender, and the destination address is - the multicast group address. An inbound, multicast SA must be - configured with the source addresses of each peer authorized to - transmit to the multicast SA in question. The SPI value for a - multicast SA is provided by a multicast group controller, not by the - receiver, as for a unicast SA. Because an SAD entry may be required - to accommodate multiple, individual IP source addresses that were - part of an SPD entry (for unicast SAs), the required facility for - inbound, multicast SAs is a feature already present in an IPsec - implementation. However, because the SPD has no provisions for - accommodating multicast entries, this document does not specify an - automated way to create an SAD entry for a multicast, inbound SA. - Only manually configured SAD entries can be created to accommodate - inbound, multicast traffic. - - Implementation Guidance: This document does not specify how an SPD-S - entry refers to the corresponding SAD entry, as this is an - implementation-specific detail. However, some implementations (based - on experience from RFC 2401) are known to have problems in this - regard. In particular, simply storing the (remote tunnel header IP - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 35] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - address, remote SPI) pair in the SPD cache is not sufficient, since - the pair does not always uniquely identify a single SAD entry. For - instance, two hosts behind the same NAT could choose the same SPI - value. The situation also may arise if a host is assigned an IP - address (e.g., via DHCP) previously used by some other host, and the - SAs associated with the old host have not yet been deleted via dead - peer detection mechanisms. This may lead to packets being sent over - the wrong SA or, if key management ensures the pair is unique, - denying the creation of otherwise valid SAs. Thus, implementors - should implement links between the SPD cache and the SAD in a way - that does not engender such problems. - -4.4.2.1. Data Items in the SAD - - The following data items MUST be in the SAD: - - o Security Parameter Index (SPI): a 32-bit value selected by the - receiving end of an SA to uniquely identify the SA. In an SAD - entry for an outbound SA, the SPI is used to construct the - packet's AH or ESP header. In an SAD entry for an inbound SA, the - SPI is used to map traffic to the appropriate SA (see text on - unicast/multicast in Section 4.1). - - o Sequence Number Counter: a 64-bit counter used to generate the - Sequence Number field in AH or ESP headers. 64-bit sequence - numbers are the default, but 32-bit sequence numbers are also - supported if negotiated. - - o Sequence Counter Overflow: a flag indicating whether overflow of - the sequence number counter should generate an auditable event and - prevent transmission of additional packets on the SA, or whether - rollover is permitted. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD - include the SPI value, current date/time, Local Address, Remote - Address, and the selectors from the relevant SAD entry. - - o Anti-Replay Window: a 64-bit counter and a bit-map (or equivalent) - used to determine whether an inbound AH or ESP packet is a replay. - - Note: If anti-replay has been disabled by the receiver for an SA, - e.g., in the case of a manually keyed SA, then the Anti-Replay - Window is ignored for the SA in question. 64-bit sequence numbers - are the default, but this counter size accommodates 32-bit - sequence numbers as well. - - o AH Authentication algorithm, key, etc. This is required only if - AH is supported. - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 36] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - o ESP Encryption algorithm, key, mode, IV, etc. If a combined mode - algorithm is used, these fields will not be applicable. - - o ESP integrity algorithm, keys, etc. If the integrity service is - not selected, these fields will not be applicable. If a combined - mode algorithm is used, these fields will not be applicable. - - o ESP combined mode algorithms, key(s), etc. This data is used when - a combined mode (encryption and integrity) algorithm is used with - ESP. If a combined mode algorithm is not used, these fields are - not applicable. - - o Lifetime of this SA: a time interval after which an SA must be - replaced with a new SA (and new SPI) or terminated, plus an - indication of which of these actions should occur. This may be - expressed as a time or byte count, or a simultaneous use of both - with the first lifetime to expire taking precedence. A compliant - implementation MUST support both types of lifetimes, and MUST - support a simultaneous use of both. If time is employed, and if - IKE employs X.509 certificates for SA establishment, the SA - lifetime must be constrained by the validity intervals of the - certificates, and the NextIssueDate of the Certificate Revocation - Lists (CRLs) used in the IKE exchange for the SA. Both initiator - and responder are responsible for constraining the SA lifetime in - this fashion. Note: The details of how to handle the refreshing - of keys when SAs expire is a local matter. However, one - reasonable approach is: - - (a) If byte count is used, then the implementation SHOULD count the - number of bytes to which the IPsec cryptographic algorithm is - applied. For ESP, this is the encryption algorithm (including - Null encryption) and for AH, this is the authentication - algorithm. This includes pad bytes, etc. Note that - implementations MUST be able to handle having the counters at - the ends of an SA get out of synch, e.g., because of packet - loss or because the implementations at each end of the SA - aren't doing things the same way. - - (b) There SHOULD be two kinds of lifetime -- a soft lifetime that - warns the implementation to initiate action such as setting up - a replacement SA, and a hard lifetime when the current SA ends - and is destroyed. - - (c) If the entire packet does not get delivered during the SA's - lifetime, the packet SHOULD be discarded. - - o IPsec protocol mode: tunnel or transport. Indicates which mode of - AH or ESP is applied to traffic on this SA. - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 37] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - o Stateful fragment checking flag. Indicates whether or not - stateful fragment checking applies to this SA. - - o Bypass DF bit (T/F) -- applicable to tunnel mode SAs where both - inner and outer headers are IPv4. - - o DSCP values -- the set of DSCP values allowed for packets carried - over this SA. If no values are specified, no DSCP-specific - filtering is applied. If one or more values are specified, these - are used to select one SA among several that match the traffic - selectors for an outbound packet. Note that these values are NOT - checked against inbound traffic arriving on the SA. - - o Bypass DSCP (T/F) or map to unprotected DSCP values (array) if - needed to restrict bypass of DSCP values -- applicable to tunnel - mode SAs. This feature maps DSCP values from an inner header to - values in an outer header, e.g., to address covert channel - signaling concerns. - - o Path MTU: any observed path MTU and aging variables. - - o Tunnel header IP source and destination address -- both addresses - must be either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. The version implies the - type of IP header to be used. Only used when the IPsec protocol - mode is tunnel. - -4.4.2.2. Relationship between SPD, PFP flag, packet, and SAD - - For each selector, the following tables show the relationship - between the value in the SPD, the PFP flag, the value in the - triggering packet, and the resulting value in the SAD. Note that - the administrative interface for IPsec can use various syntactic - options to make it easier for the administrator to enter rules. - For example, although a list of ranges is what IKEv2 sends, it - might be clearer and less error prone for the user to enter a - single IP address or IP address prefix. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 38] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Value in - Triggering Resulting SAD - Selector SPD Entry PFP Packet Entry - -------- ---------------- --- ------------ -------------- - loc addr list of ranges 0 IP addr "S" list of ranges - ANY 0 IP addr "S" ANY - list of ranges 1 IP addr "S" "S" - ANY 1 IP addr "S" "S" - - rem addr list of ranges 0 IP addr "D" list of ranges - ANY 0 IP addr "D" ANY - list of ranges 1 IP addr "D" "D" - ANY 1 IP addr "D" "D" - - protocol list of prot's* 0 prot. "P" list of prot's* - ANY** 0 prot. "P" ANY - OPAQUE**** 0 prot. "P" OPAQUE - - list of prot's* 0 not avail. discard packet - ANY** 0 not avail. ANY - OPAQUE**** 0 not avail. OPAQUE - - list of prot's* 1 prot. "P" "P" - ANY** 1 prot. "P" "P" - OPAQUE**** 1 prot. "P" *** - - list of prot's* 1 not avail. discard packet - ANY** 1 not avail. discard packet - OPAQUE**** 1 not avail. *** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 39] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - If the protocol is one that has two ports, then there will be - selectors for both Local and Remote ports. - - Value in - Triggering Resulting SAD - Selector SPD Entry PFP Packet Entry - -------- ---------------- --- ------------ -------------- - loc port list of ranges 0 src port "s" list of ranges - ANY 0 src port "s" ANY - OPAQUE 0 src port "s" OPAQUE - - list of ranges 0 not avail. discard packet - ANY 0 not avail. ANY - OPAQUE 0 not avail. OPAQUE - - list of ranges 1 src port "s" "s" - ANY 1 src port "s" "s" - OPAQUE 1 src port "s" *** - - list of ranges 1 not avail. discard packet - ANY 1 not avail. discard packet - OPAQUE 1 not avail. *** - - - rem port list of ranges 0 dst port "d" list of ranges - ANY 0 dst port "d" ANY - OPAQUE 0 dst port "d" OPAQUE - - list of ranges 0 not avail. discard packet - ANY 0 not avail. ANY - OPAQUE 0 not avail. OPAQUE - - list of ranges 1 dst port "d" "d" - ANY 1 dst port "d" "d" - OPAQUE 1 dst port "d" *** - - list of ranges 1 not avail. discard packet - ANY 1 not avail. discard packet - OPAQUE 1 not avail. *** - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 40] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - If the protocol is mobility header, then there will be a selector - for mh type. - - Value in - Triggering Resulting SAD - Selector SPD Entry PFP Packet Entry - -------- ---------------- --- ------------ -------------- - mh type list of ranges 0 mh type "T" list of ranges - ANY 0 mh type "T" ANY - OPAQUE 0 mh type "T" OPAQUE - - list of ranges 0 not avail. discard packet - ANY 0 not avail. ANY - OPAQUE 0 not avail. OPAQUE - - list of ranges 1 mh type "T" "T" - ANY 1 mh type "T" "T" - OPAQUE 1 mh type "T" *** - - list of ranges 1 not avail. discard packet - ANY 1 not avail. discard packet - OPAQUE 1 not avail. *** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 41] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - If the protocol is ICMP, then there will be a 16-bit selector for - ICMP type and ICMP code. Note that the type and code are bound to - each other, i.e., the codes apply to the particular type. This - 16-bit selector can contain a single type and a range of codes, a - single type and ANY code, and ANY type and ANY code. - - Value in - Triggering Resulting SAD - Selector SPD Entry PFP Packet Entry - --------- ---------------- --- ------------ -------------- - ICMP type a single type & 0 type "t" & single type & - and code range of codes code "c" range of codes - a single type & 0 type "t" & single type & - ANY code code "c" ANY code - ANY type & ANY 0 type "t" & ANY type & - code code "c" ANY code - OPAQUE 0 type "t" & OPAQUE - code "c" - - a single type & 0 not avail. discard packet - range of codes - a single type & 0 not avail. discard packet - ANY code - ANY type & 0 not avail. ANY type & - ANY code ANY code - OPAQUE 0 not avail. OPAQUE - - a single type & 1 type "t" & "t" and "c" - range of codes code "c" - a single type & 1 type "t" & "t" and "c" - ANY code code "c" - ANY type & 1 type "t" & "t" and "c" - ANY code code "c" - OPAQUE 1 type "t" & *** - code "c" - - a single type & 1 not avail. discard packet - range of codes - a single type & 1 not avail. discard packet - ANY code - ANY type & 1 not avail. discard packet - ANY code - OPAQUE 1 not avail. *** - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 42] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - If the name selector is used: - - Value in - Triggering Resulting SAD - Selector SPD Entry PFP Packet Entry - --------- ---------------- --- ------------ -------------- - name list of user or N/A N/A N/A - system names - - * "List of protocols" is the information, not the way - that the SPD or SAD or IKEv2 have to represent this - information. - ** 0 (zero) is used by IKE to indicate ANY for - protocol. - *** Use of PFP=1 with an OPAQUE value is an error and - SHOULD be prohibited by an IPsec implementation. - **** The protocol field cannot be OPAQUE in IPv4. This - table entry applies only to IPv6. - -4.4.3. Peer Authorization Database (PAD) - - The Peer Authorization Database (PAD) provides the link between the - SPD and a security association management protocol such as IKE. It - embodies several critical functions: - - o identifies the peers or groups of peers that are authorized - to communicate with this IPsec entity - o specifies the protocol and method used to authenticate each - peer - o provides the authentication data for each peer - o constrains the types and values of IDs that can be asserted - by a peer with regard to child SA creation, to ensure that the - peer does not assert identities for lookup in the SPD that it - is not authorized to represent, when child SAs are created - o peer gateway location info, e.g., IP address(es) or DNS names, - MAY be included for peers that are known to be "behind" a - security gateway - - The PAD provides these functions for an IKE peer when the peer acts - as either the initiator or the responder. - - To perform these functions, the PAD contains an entry for each peer - or group of peers with which the IPsec entity will communicate. An - entry names an individual peer (a user, end system or security - gateway) or specifies a group of peers (using ID matching rules - defined below). The entry specifies the authentication protocol - (e.g., IKEv1, IKEv2, KINK) method used (e.g., certificates or pre- - shared secrets) and the authentication data (e.g., the pre-shared - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 43] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - secret or the trust anchor relative to which the peer's certificate - will be validated). For certificate-based authentication, the entry - also may provide information to assist in verifying the revocation - status of the peer, e.g., a pointer to a CRL repository or the name - of an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server associated - with the peer or with the trust anchor associated with the peer. - - Each entry also specifies whether the IKE ID payload will be used as - a symbolic name for SPD lookup, or whether the remote IP address - provided in traffic selector payloads will be used for SPD lookups - when child SAs are created. - - Note that the PAD information MAY be used to support creation of more - than one tunnel mode SA at a time between two peers, e.g., two - tunnels to protect the same addresses/hosts, but with different - tunnel endpoints. - -4.4.3.1. PAD Entry IDs and Matching Rules - - The PAD is an ordered database, where the order is defined by an - administrator (or a user in the case of a single-user end system). - Usually, the same administrator will be responsible for both the PAD - and SPD, since the two databases must be coordinated. The ordering - requirement for the PAD arises for the same reason as for the SPD, - i.e., because use of "star name" entries allows for overlaps in the - set of IKE IDs that could match a specific entry. - - Six types of IDs are supported for entries in the PAD, consistent - with the symbolic name types and IP addresses used to identify SPD - entries. The ID for each entry acts as the index for the PAD, i.e., - it is the value used to select an entry. All of these ID types can - be used to match IKE ID payload types. The six types are: - - o DNS name (specific or partial) - o Distinguished Name (complete or sub-tree constrained) - o RFC 822 email address (complete or partially qualified) - o IPv4 address (range) - o IPv6 address (range) - o Key ID (exact match only) - - The first three name types can accommodate sub-tree matching as well - as exact matches. A DNS name may be fully qualified and thus match - exactly one name, e.g., foo.example.com. Alternatively, the name may - encompass a group of peers by being partially specified, e.g., the - string ".example.com" could be used to match any DNS name ending in - these two domain name components. - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 44] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Similarly, a Distinguished Name may specify a complete Distinguished - Name to match exactly one entry, e.g., CN = Stephen, O = BBN - Technologies, SP = MA, C = US. Alternatively, an entry may encompass - a group of peers by specifying a sub-tree, e.g., an entry of the form - "C = US, SP = MA" might be used to match all DNs that contain these - two attributes as the top two Relative Distinguished Names (RDNs). - - For an RFC 822 e-mail addresses, the same options exist. A complete - address such as foo@example.com matches one entity, but a sub-tree - name such as "@example.com" could be used to match all the entities - with names ending in those two domain names to the right of the @. - - The specific syntax used by an implementation to accommodate sub-tree - matching for distinguished names, domain names or RFC 822 e-mail - addresses is a local matter. But, at a minimum, sub-tree matching of - the sort described above MUST be supported. (Substring matching - within a DN, DNS name, or RFC 822 address MAY be supported, but is - not required.) - - For IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, the same address range syntax used for - SPD entries MUST be supported. This allows specification of an - individual address (via a trivial range), an address prefix (by - choosing a range that adheres to Classless Inter-Domain Routing - (CIDR)-style prefixes), or an arbitrary address range. - - The Key ID field is defined as an OCTET string in IKE. For this name - type, only exact-match syntax MUST be supported (since there is no - explicit structure for this ID type). Additional matching functions - MAY be supported for this ID type. - -4.4.3.2. IKE Peer Authentication Data - - Once an entry is located based on an ordered search of the PAD based - on ID field matching, it is necessary to verify the asserted - identity, i.e., to authenticate the asserted ID. For each PAD entry, - there is an indication of the type of authentication to be performed. - This document requires support for two required authentication data - types: - - - X.509 certificate - - pre-shared secret - - For authentication based on an X.509 certificate, the PAD entry - contains a trust anchor via which the end entity (EE) certificate for - the peer must be verifiable, either directly or via a certificate - path. See RFC 3280 for the definition of a trust anchor. An entry - used with certificate-based authentication MAY include additional - data to facilitate certificate revocation status, e.g., a list of - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 45] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - appropriate OCSP responders or CRL repositories, and associated - authentication data. For authentication based on a pre-shared - secret, the PAD contains the pre-shared secret to be used by IKE. - - This document does not require that the IKE ID asserted by a peer be - syntactically related to a specific field in an end entity - certificate that is employed to authenticate the identity of that - peer. However, it often will be appropriate to impose such a - requirement, e.g., when a single entry represents a set of peers each - of whom may have a distinct SPD entry. Thus, implementations MUST - provide a means for an administrator to require a match between an - asserted IKE ID and the subject name or subject alt name in a - certificate. The former is applicable to IKE IDs expressed as - distinguished names; the latter is appropriate for DNS names, RFC 822 - e-mail addresses, and IP addresses. Since KEY ID is intended for - identifying a peer authenticated via a pre-shared secret, there is no - requirement to match this ID type to a certificate field. - - See IKEv1 [HarCar98] and IKEv2 [Kau05] for details of how IKE - performs peer authentication using certificates or pre-shared - secrets. - - This document does not mandate support for any other authentication - methods, although such methods MAY be employed. - -4.4.3.3. Child SA Authorization Data - - Once an IKE peer is authenticated, child SAs may be created. Each - PAD entry contains data to constrain the set of IDs that can be - asserted by an IKE peer, for matching against the SPD. Each PAD - entry indicates whether the IKE ID is to be used as a symbolic name - for SPD matching, or whether an IP address asserted in a traffic - selector payload is to be used. - - If the entry indicates that the IKE ID is to be used, then the PAD - entry ID field defines the authorized set of IDs. If the entry - indicates that child SAs traffic selectors are to be used, then an - additional data element is required, in the form of IPv4 and/or IPv6 - address ranges. (A peer may be authorized for both address types, so - there MUST be provision for both a v4 and a v6 address range.) - -4.4.3.4. How the PAD Is Used - - During the initial IKE exchange, the initiator and responder each - assert their identity via the IKE ID payload and send an AUTH payload - to verify the asserted identity. One or more CERT payloads may be - transmitted to facilitate the verification of each asserted identity. - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 46] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - When an IKE entity receives an IKE ID payload, it uses the asserted - ID to locate an entry in the PAD, using the matching rules described - above. The PAD entry specifies the authentication method to be - employed for the identified peer. This ensures that the right method - is used for each peer and that different methods can be used for - different peers. The entry also specifies the authentication data - that will be used to verify the asserted identity. This data is - employed in conjunction with the specified method to authenticate the - peer, before any CHILD SAs are created. - - Child SAs are created based on the exchange of traffic selector - payloads, either at the end of the initial IKE exchange or in - subsequent CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges. The PAD entry for the (now - authenticated) IKE peer is used to constrain creation of child SAs; - specifically, the PAD entry specifies how the SPD is searched using a - traffic selector proposal from a peer. There are two choices: either - the IKE ID asserted by the peer is used to find an SPD entry via its - symbolic name, or peer IP addresses asserted in traffic selector - payloads are used for SPD lookups based on the remote IP address - field portion of an SPD entry. It is necessary to impose these - constraints on creation of child SAs to prevent an authenticated peer - from spoofing IDs associated with other, legitimate peers. - - Note that because the PAD is checked before searching for an SPD - entry, this safeguard protects an initiator against spoofing attacks. - For example, assume that IKE A receives an outbound packet destined - for IP address X, a host served by a security gateway. RFC 2401 - [RFC2401] and this document do not specify how A determines the - address of the IKE peer serving X. However, any peer contacted by A - as the presumed representative for X must be registered in the PAD in - order to allow the IKE exchange to be authenticated. Moreover, when - the authenticated peer asserts that it represents X in its traffic - selector exchange, the PAD will be consulted to determine if the peer - in question is authorized to represent X. Thus, the PAD provides a - binding of address ranges (or name sub-spaces) to peers, to counter - such attacks. - -4.5. SA and Key Management - - All IPsec implementations MUST support both manual and automated SA - and cryptographic key management. The IPsec protocols, AH and ESP, - are largely independent of the associated SA management techniques, - although the techniques involved do affect some of the security - services offered by the protocols. For example, the optional - anti-replay service available for AH and ESP requires automated SA - management. Moreover, the granularity of key distribution employed - with IPsec determines the granularity of authentication provided. In - general, data origin authentication in AH and ESP is limited by the - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 47] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - extent to which secrets used with the integrity algorithm (or with a - key management protocol that creates such secrets) are shared among - multiple possible sources. - - The following text describes the minimum requirements for both types - of SA management. - -4.5.1. Manual Techniques - - The simplest form of management is manual management, in which a - person manually configures each system with keying material and SA - management data relevant to secure communication with other systems. - Manual techniques are practical in small, static environments but - they do not scale well. For example, a company could create a - virtual private network (VPN) using IPsec in security gateways at - several sites. If the number of sites is small, and since all the - sites come under the purview of a single administrative domain, this - might be a feasible context for manual management techniques. In - this case, the security gateway might selectively protect traffic to - and from other sites within the organization using a manually - configured key, while not protecting traffic for other destinations. - It also might be appropriate when only selected communications need - to be secured. A similar argument might apply to use of IPsec - entirely within an organization for a small number of hosts and/or - gateways. Manual management techniques often employ statically - configured, symmetric keys, though other options also exist. - -4.5.2. Automated SA and Key Management - - Widespread deployment and use of IPsec requires an Internet-standard, - scalable, automated, SA management protocol. Such support is - required to facilitate use of the anti-replay features of AH and ESP, - and to accommodate on-demand creation of SAs, e.g., for user- and - session-oriented keying. (Note that the notion of "rekeying" an SA - actually implies creation of a new SA with a new SPI, a process that - generally implies use of an automated SA/key management protocol.) - - The default automated key management protocol selected for use with - IPsec is IKEv2 [Kau05]. This document assumes the availability of - certain functions from the key management protocol that are not - supported by IKEv1. Other automated SA management protocols MAY be - employed. - - When an automated SA/key management protocol is employed, the output - from this protocol is used to generate multiple keys for a single SA. - This also occurs because distinct keys are used for each of the two - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 48] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - SAs created by IKE. If both integrity and confidentiality are - employed, then a minimum of four keys are required. Additionally, - some cryptographic algorithms may require multiple keys, e.g., 3DES. - - The Key Management System may provide a separate string of bits for - each key or it may generate one string of bits from which all keys - are extracted. If a single string of bits is provided, care needs to - be taken to ensure that the parts of the system that map the string - of bits to the required keys do so in the same fashion at both ends - of the SA. To ensure that the IPsec implementations at each end of - the SA use the same bits for the same keys, and irrespective of which - part of the system divides the string of bits into individual keys, - the encryption keys MUST be taken from the first (left-most, - high-order) bits and the integrity keys MUST be taken from the - remaining bits. The number of bits for each key is defined in the - relevant cryptographic algorithm specification RFC. In the case of - multiple encryption keys or multiple integrity keys, the - specification for the cryptographic algorithm must specify the order - in which they are to be selected from a single string of bits - provided to the cryptographic algorithm. - -4.5.3. Locating a Security Gateway - - This section discusses issues relating to how a host learns about the - existence of relevant security gateways and, once a host has - contacted these security gateways, how it knows that these are the - correct security gateways. The details of where the required - information is stored is a local matter, but the Peer Authorization - Database (PAD) described in Section 4.4 is the most likely candidate. - (Note: S* indicates a system that is running IPsec, e.g., SH1 and SG2 - below.) - - Consider a situation in which a remote host (SH1) is using the - Internet to gain access to a server or other machine (H2) and there - is a security gateway (SG2), e.g., a firewall, through which H1's - traffic must pass. An example of this situation would be a mobile - host crossing the Internet to his home organization's firewall (SG2). - This situation raises several issues: - - 1. How does SH1 know/learn about the existence of the security - gateway SG2? - - 2. How does it authenticate SG2, and once it has authenticated SG2, - how does it confirm that SG2 has been authorized to represent H2? - - 3. How does SG2 authenticate SH1 and verify that SH1 is authorized to - contact H2? - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 49] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - 4. How does SH1 know/learn about any additional gateways that provide - alternate paths to H2? - - To address these problems, an IPsec-supporting host or security - gateway MUST have an administrative interface that allows the - user/administrator to configure the address of one or more security - gateways for ranges of destination addresses that require its use. - This includes the ability to configure information for locating and - authenticating one or more security gateways and verifying the - authorization of these gateways to represent the destination host. - (The authorization function is implied in the PAD.) This document - does not address the issue of how to automate the - discovery/verification of security gateways. - -4.6. SAs and Multicast - - The receiver-orientation of the SA implies that, in the case of - unicast traffic, the destination system will select the SPI value. - By having the destination select the SPI value, there is no potential - for manually configured SAs to conflict with automatically configured - (e.g., via a key management protocol) SAs or for SAs from multiple - sources to conflict with each other. For multicast traffic, there - are multiple destination systems associated with a single SA. So - some system or person will need to coordinate among all multicast - groups to select an SPI or SPIs on behalf of each multicast group and - then communicate the group's IPsec information to all of the - legitimate members of that multicast group via mechanisms not defined - here. - - Multiple senders to a multicast group SHOULD use a single Security - Association (and hence SPI) for all traffic to that group when a - symmetric key encryption or integrity algorithm is employed. In such - circumstances, the receiver knows only that the message came from a - system possessing the key for that multicast group. In such - circumstances, a receiver generally will not be able to authenticate - which system sent the multicast traffic. Specifications for other, - more general multicast approaches are deferred to the IETF Multicast - Security Working Group. - -5. IP Traffic Processing - - As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, "The Security Policy Database (SPD)", - the SPD (or associated caches) MUST be consulted during the - processing of all traffic that crosses the IPsec protection boundary, - including IPsec management traffic. If no policy is found in the SPD - that matches a packet (for either inbound or outbound traffic), the - packet MUST be discarded. To simplify processing, and to allow for - very fast SA lookups (for SG/BITS/BITW), this document introduces the - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 50] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - notion of an SPD cache for all outbound traffic (SPD-O plus SPD-S), - and a cache for inbound, non-IPsec-protected traffic (SPD-I). (As - mentioned earlier, the SAD acts as a cache for checking the selectors - of inbound IPsec-protected traffic arriving on SAs.) There is - nominally one cache per SPD. For the purposes of this specification, - it is assumed that each cached entry will map to exactly one SA. - Note, however, exceptions arise when one uses multiple SAs to carry - traffic of different priorities (e.g., as indicated by distinct DSCP - values) but the same selectors. Note also, that there are a couple - of situations in which the SAD can have entries for SAs that do not - have corresponding entries in the SPD. Since this document does not - mandate that the SAD be selectively cleared when the SPD is changed, - SAD entries can remain when the SPD entries that created them are - changed or deleted. Also, if a manually keyed SA is created, there - could be an SAD entry for this SA that does not correspond to any SPD - entry. - - Since SPD entries may overlap, one cannot safely cache these entries - in general. Simple caching might result in a match against a cache - entry, whereas an ordered search of the SPD would have resulted in a - match against a different entry. But, if the SPD entries are first - decorrelated, then the resulting entries can safely be cached. Each - cached entry will indicate that matching traffic should be bypassed - or discarded, appropriately. (Note: The original SPD entry might - result in multiple SAs, e.g., because of PFP.) Unless otherwise - noted, all references below to the "SPD" or "SPD cache" or "cache" - are to a decorrelated SPD (SPD-I, SPD-O, SPD-S) or the SPD cache - containing entries from the decorrelated SPD. - - Note: In a host IPsec implementation based on sockets, the SPD will - be consulted whenever a new socket is created to determine what, if - any, IPsec processing will be applied to the traffic that will flow - on that socket. This provides an implicit caching mechanism, and the - portions of the preceding discussion that address caching can be - ignored in such implementations. - - Note: It is assumed that one starts with a correlated SPD because - that is how users and administrators are accustomed to managing these - sorts of access control lists or firewall filter rules. Then the - decorrelation algorithm is applied to build a list of cache-able SPD - entries. The decorrelation is invisible at the management interface. - - For inbound IPsec traffic, the SAD entry selected by the SPI serves - as the cache for the selectors to be matched against arriving IPsec - packets, after AH or ESP processing has been performed. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 51] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -5.1. Outbound IP Traffic Processing (protected-to-unprotected) - - First consider the path for traffic entering the implementation via a - protected interface and exiting via an unprotected interface. - - Unprotected Interface - ^ - | - (nested SAs) +----------+ - -------------------|Forwarding|<-----+ - | +----------+ | - | ^ | - | | BYPASS | - V +-----+ | - +-------+ | SPD | +--------+ - ...| SPD-I |.................|Cache|.....|PROCESS |...IPsec - | (*) | | (*) |---->|(AH/ESP)| boundary - +-------+ +-----+ +--------+ - | +-------+ / ^ - | |DISCARD| <--/ | - | +-------+ | - | | - | +-------------+ - |---------------->|SPD Selection| - +-------------+ - ^ - | +------+ - | -->| ICMP | - | / +------+ - |/ - | - | - Protected Interface - - - Figure 2. Processing Model for Outbound Traffic - (*) = The SPD caches are shown here. If there - is a cache miss, then the SPD is checked. - There is no requirement that an - implementation buffer the packet if - there is a cache miss. - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 52] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - IPsec MUST perform the following steps when processing outbound - packets: - - 1. When a packet arrives from the subscriber (protected) interface, - invoke the SPD selection function to obtain the SPD-ID needed to - choose the appropriate SPD. (If the implementation uses only one - SPD, this step is a no-op.) - - 2. Match the packet headers against the cache for the SPD specified - by the SPD-ID from step 1. Note that this cache contains entries - from SPD-O and SPD-S. - - 3a. If there is a match, then process the packet as specified by the - matching cache entry, i.e., BYPASS, DISCARD, or PROTECT using AH - or ESP. If IPsec processing is applied, there is a link from the - SPD cache entry to the relevant SAD entry (specifying the mode, - cryptographic algorithms, keys, SPI, PMTU, etc.). IPsec - processing is as previously defined, for tunnel or transport - modes and for AH or ESP, as specified in their respective RFCs - [Ken05b, Ken05a]. Note that the SA PMTU value, plus the value of - the stateful fragment checking flag (and the DF bit in the IP - header of the outbound packet) determine whether the packet can - (must) be fragmented prior to or after IPsec processing, or if it - must be discarded and an ICMP PMTU message is sent. - - 3b. If no match is found in the cache, search the SPD (SPD-S and - SPD-O parts) specified by SPD-ID. If the SPD entry calls for - BYPASS or DISCARD, create one or more new outbound SPD cache - entries and if BYPASS, create one or more new inbound SPD cache - entries. (More than one cache entry may be created since a - decorrelated SPD entry may be linked to other such entries that - were created as a side effect of the decorrelation process.) If - the SPD entry calls for PROTECT, i.e., creation of an SA, the key - management mechanism (e.g., IKEv2) is invoked to create the SA. - If SA creation succeeds, a new outbound (SPD-S) cache entry is - created, along with outbound and inbound SAD entries, otherwise - the packet is discarded. (A packet that triggers an SPD lookup - MAY be discarded by the implementation, or it MAY be processed - against the newly created cache entry, if one is created.) Since - SAs are created in pairs, an SAD entry for the corresponding - inbound SA also is created, and it contains the selector values - derived from the SPD entry (and packet, if any PFP flags were - "true") used to create the inbound SA, for use in checking - inbound traffic delivered via the SA. - - 4. The packet is passed to the outbound forwarding function - (operating outside of the IPsec implementation), to select the - interface to which the packet will be directed. This function - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 53] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - may cause the packet to be passed back across the IPsec boundary, - for additional IPsec processing, e.g., in support of nested SAs. - If so, there MUST be an entry in SPD-I database that permits - inbound bypassing of the packet, otherwise the packet will be - discarded. If necessary, i.e., if there is more than one SPD-I, - the traffic being looped back MAY be tagged as coming from this - internal interface. This would allow the use of a different - SPD-I for "real" external traffic vs. looped traffic, if needed. - - Note: With the exception of IPv4 and IPv6 transport mode, an SG, - BITS, or BITW implementation MAY fragment packets before applying - IPsec. (This applies only to IPv4. For IPv6 packets, only the - originator is allowed to fragment them.) The device SHOULD have a - configuration setting to disable this. The resulting fragments are - evaluated against the SPD in the normal manner. Thus, fragments not - containing port numbers (or ICMP message type and code, or Mobility - Header type) will only match rules having port (or ICMP message type - and code, or MH type) selectors of OPAQUE or ANY. (See Section 7 for - more details.) - - Note: With regard to determining and enforcing the PMTU of an SA, the - IPsec system MUST follow the steps described in Section 8.2. - -5.1.1. Handling an Outbound Packet That Must Be Discarded - - If an IPsec system receives an outbound packet that it finds it must - discard, it SHOULD be capable of generating and sending an ICMP - message to indicate to the sender of the outbound packet that the - packet was discarded. The type and code of the ICMP message will - depend on the reason for discarding the packet, as specified below. - The reason SHOULD be recorded in the audit log. The audit log entry - for this event SHOULD include the reason, current date/time, and the - selector values from the packet. - - a. The selectors of the packet matched an SPD entry requiring the - packet to be discarded. - - IPv4 Type = 3 (destination unreachable) Code = 13 - (Communication Administratively Prohibited) - - IPv6 Type = 1 (destination unreachable) Code = 1 - (Communication with destination administratively - prohibited) - - b1. The IPsec system successfully reached the remote peer but was - unable to negotiate the SA required by the SPD entry matching the - packet because, for example, the remote peer is administratively - prohibited from communicating with the initiator, the initiating - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 54] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - peer was unable to authenticate itself to the remote peer, the - remote peer was unable to authenticate itself to the initiating - peer, or the SPD at the remote peer did not have a suitable - entry. - - IPv4 Type = 3 (destination unreachable) Code = 13 - (Communication Administratively Prohibited) - - IPv6 Type = 1 (destination unreachable) Code = 1 - (Communication with destination administratively - prohibited) - - b2. The IPsec system was unable to set up the SA required by the SPD - entry matching the packet because the IPsec peer at the other end - of the exchange could not be contacted. - - IPv4 Type = 3 (destination unreachable) Code = 1 (host - unreachable) - - IPv6 Type = 1 (destination unreachable) Code = 3 (address - unreachable) - - Note that an attacker behind a security gateway could send packets - with a spoofed source address, W.X.Y.Z, to an IPsec entity causing it - to send ICMP messages to W.X.Y.Z. This creates an opportunity for a - denial of service (DoS) attack among hosts behind a security gateway. - To address this, a security gateway SHOULD include a management - control to allow an administrator to configure an IPsec - implementation to send or not send the ICMP messages under these - circumstances, and if this facility is selected, to rate limit the - transmission of such ICMP responses. - -5.1.2. Header Construction for Tunnel Mode - - This section describes the handling of the inner and outer IP - headers, extension headers, and options for AH and ESP tunnels, with - regard to outbound traffic processing. This includes how to - construct the encapsulating (outer) IP header, how to process fields - in the inner IP header, and what other actions should be taken for - outbound, tunnel mode traffic. The general processing described here - is modeled after RFC 2003, "IP Encapsulation within IP" [Per96]: - - o The outer IP header Source Address and Destination Address - identify the "endpoints" of the tunnel (the encapsulator and - decapsulator). The inner IP header Source Address and Destination - Addresses identify the original sender and recipient of the - datagram (from the perspective of this tunnel), respectively. - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 55] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - (See footnote 3 after the table in 5.1.2.1 for more details on the - encapsulating source IP address.) - - o The inner IP header is not changed except as noted below for TTL - (or Hop Limit) and the DS/ECN Fields. The inner IP header - otherwise remains unchanged during its delivery to the tunnel exit - point. - - o No change to IP options or extension headers in the inner header - occurs during delivery of the encapsulated datagram through the - tunnel. - - Note: IPsec tunnel mode is different from IP-in-IP tunneling (RFC - 2003 [Per96]) in several ways: - - o IPsec offers certain controls to a security administrator to - manage covert channels (which would not normally be a concern for - tunneling) and to ensure that the receiver examines the right - portions of the received packet with respect to application of - access controls. An IPsec implementation MAY be configurable with - regard to how it processes the outer DS field for tunnel mode for - transmitted packets. For outbound traffic, one configuration - setting for the outer DS field will operate as described in the - following sections on IPv4 and IPv6 header processing for IPsec - tunnels. Another will allow the outer DS field to be mapped to a - fixed value, which MAY be configured on a per-SA basis. (The value - might really be fixed for all traffic outbound from a device, but - per-SA granularity allows that as well.) This configuration option - allows a local administrator to decide whether the covert channel - provided by copying these bits outweighs the benefits of copying. - - o IPsec describes how to handle ECN or DS and provides the ability - to control propagation of changes in these fields between - unprotected and protected domains. In general, propagation from a - protected to an unprotected domain is a covert channel and thus - controls are provided to manage the bandwidth of this channel. - Propagation of ECN values in the other direction are controlled so - that only legitimate ECN changes (indicating occurrence of - congestion between the tunnel endpoints) are propagated. By - default, DS propagation from an unprotected domain to a protected - domain is not permitted. However, if the sender and receiver do - not share the same DS code space, and the receiver has no way of - learning how to map between the two spaces, then it may be - appropriate to deviate from the default. Specifically, an IPsec - implementation MAY be configurable in terms of how it processes - the outer DS field for tunnel mode for received packets. It may - be configured to either discard the outer DS value (the default) - OR to overwrite the inner DS field with the outer DS field. If - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 56] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - offered, the discard vs. overwrite behavior MAY be configured on a - per-SA basis. This configuration option allows a local - administrator to decide whether the vulnerabilities created by - copying these bits outweigh the benefits of copying. See - [RFC2983] for further information on when each of these behaviors - may be useful, and also for the possible need for diffserv traffic - conditioning prior or subsequent to IPsec processing (including - tunnel decapsulation). - - o IPsec allows the IP version of the encapsulating header to be - different from that of the inner header. - - The tables in the following sub-sections show the handling for the - different header/option fields ("constructed" means that the value in - the outer field is constructed independently of the value in the - inner). - -5.1.2.1. IPv4: Header Construction for Tunnel Mode - - <-- How Outer Hdr Relates to Inner Hdr --> - Outer Hdr at Inner Hdr at - IPv4 Encapsulator Decapsulator - Header fields: -------------------- ------------ - version 4 (1) no change - header length constructed no change - DS Field copied from inner hdr (5) no change - ECN Field copied from inner hdr constructed (6) - total length constructed no change - ID constructed no change - flags (DF,MF) constructed, DF (4) no change - fragment offset constructed no change - TTL constructed (2) decrement (2) - protocol AH, ESP no change - checksum constructed constructed (2)(6) - src address constructed (3) no change - dest address constructed (3) no change - Options never copied no change - - Notes: - - (1) The IP version in the encapsulating header can be different - from the value in the inner header. - - (2) The TTL in the inner header is decremented by the encapsulator - prior to forwarding and by the decapsulator if it forwards the - packet. (The IPv4 checksum changes when the TTL changes.) - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 57] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Note: Decrementing the TTL value is a normal part of - forwarding a packet. Thus, a packet originating from the same - node as the encapsulator does not have its TTL decremented, - since the sending node is originating the packet rather than - forwarding it. This applies to BITS and native IPsec - implementations in hosts and routers. However, the IPsec - processing model includes an external forwarding capability. - TTL processing can be used to prevent looping of packets, - e.g., due to configuration errors, within the context of this - processing model. - - (3) Local and Remote addresses depend on the SA, which is used to - determine the Remote address, which in turn determines which - Local address (net interface) is used to forward the packet. - - Note: For multicast traffic, the destination address, or - source and destination addresses, may be required for - demuxing. In that case, it is important to ensure consistency - over the lifetime of the SA by ensuring that the source - address that appears in the encapsulating tunnel header is the - same as the one that was negotiated during the SA - establishment process. There is an exception to this general - rule, i.e., a mobile IPsec implementation will update its - source address as it moves. - - (4) Configuration determines whether to copy from the inner header - (IPv4 only), clear, or set the DF. - - (5) If the packet will immediately enter a domain for which the - DSCP value in the outer header is not appropriate, that value - MUST be mapped to an appropriate value for the domain - [NiBlBaBL98]. See RFC 2475 [BBCDWW98] for further - information. - - (6) If the ECN field in the inner header is set to ECT(0) or - ECT(1), where ECT is ECN-Capable Transport (ECT), and if the - ECN field in the outer header is set to Congestion Experienced - (CE), then set the ECN field in the inner header to CE; - otherwise, make no change to the ECN field in the inner - header. (The IPv4 checksum changes when the ECN changes.) - - Note: IPsec does not copy the options from the inner header into the - outer header, nor does IPsec construct the options in the outer - header. However, post-IPsec code MAY insert/construct options for - the outer header. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 58] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -5.1.2.2. IPv6: Header Construction for Tunnel Mode - - <-- How Outer Hdr Relates Inner Hdr ---> - Outer Hdr at Inner Hdr at - IPv6 Encapsulator Decapsulator - Header fields: -------------------- ------------ - version 6 (1) no change - DS Field copied from inner hdr (5) no change (9) - ECN Field copied from inner hdr constructed (6) - flow label copied or configured (8) no change - payload length constructed no change - next header AH,ESP,routing hdr no change - hop limit constructed (2) decrement (2) - src address constructed (3) no change - dest address constructed (3) no change - Extension headers never copied (7) no change - - Notes: - - (1) - (6) See Section 5.1.2.1. - - (7) IPsec does not copy the extension headers from the inner - packet into outer headers, nor does IPsec construct extension - headers in the outer header. However, post-IPsec code MAY - insert/construct extension headers for the outer header. - - (8) See [RaCoCaDe04]. Copying is acceptable only for end systems, - not SGs. If an SG copied flow labels from the inner header to - the outer header, collisions might result. - - (9) An implementation MAY choose to provide a facility to pass the - DS value from the outer header to the inner header, on a per- - SA basis, for received tunnel mode packets. The motivation - for providing this feature is to accommodate situations in - which the DS code space at the receiver is different from that - of the sender and the receiver has no way of knowing how to - translate from the sender's space. There is a danger in - copying this value from the outer header to the inner header, - since it enables an attacker to modify the outer DSCP value in - a fashion that may adversely affect other traffic at the - receiver. Hence the default behavior for IPsec - implementations is NOT to permit such copying. - -5.2. Processing Inbound IP Traffic (unprotected-to-protected) - - Inbound processing is somewhat different from outbound processing, - because of the use of SPIs to map IPsec-protected traffic to SAs. - The inbound SPD cache (SPD-I) is applied only to bypassed or - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 59] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - discarded traffic. If an arriving packet appears to be an IPsec - fragment from an unprotected interface, reassembly is performed prior - to IPsec processing. The intent for any SPD cache is that a packet - that fails to match any entry is then referred to the corresponding - SPD. Every SPD SHOULD have a nominal, final entry that catches - anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it. This ensures - that non-IPsec-protected traffic that arrives and does not match any - SPD-I entry will be discarded. - - Unprotected Interface - | - V - +-----+ IPsec protected - ------------------->|Demux|-------------------+ - | +-----+ | - | | | - | Not IPsec | | - | | | - | V | - | +-------+ +---------+ | - | |DISCARD|<---|SPD-I (*)| | - | +-------+ +---------+ | - | | | - | |-----+ | - | | | | - | | V | - | | +------+ | - | | | ICMP | | - | | +------+ | - | | V - +---------+ | +-----------+ - ....|SPD-O (*)|............|...................|PROCESS(**)|...IPsec - +---------+ | | (AH/ESP) | Boundary - ^ | +-----------+ - | | +---+ | - | BYPASS | +-->|IKE| | - | | | +---+ | - | V | V - | +----------+ +---------+ +----+ - |--------<------|Forwarding|<---------|SAD Check|-->|ICMP| - nested SAs +----------+ | (***) | +----+ - | +---------+ - V - Protected Interface - - Figure 3. Processing Model for Inbound Traffic - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 60] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - (*) = The caches are shown here. If there is - a cache miss, then the SPD is checked. - There is no requirement that an - implementation buffer the packet if - there is a cache miss. - (**) = This processing includes using the - packet's SPI, etc., to look up the SA - in the SAD, which forms a cache of the - SPD for inbound packets (except for - cases noted in Sections 4.4.2 and 5). - See step 3a below. - (***) = This SAD check refers to step 4 below. - - Prior to performing AH or ESP processing, any IP fragments that - arrive via the unprotected interface are reassembled (by IP). Each - inbound IP datagram to which IPsec processing will be applied is - identified by the appearance of the AH or ESP values in the IP Next - Protocol field (or of AH or ESP as a next layer protocol in the IPv6 - context). - - IPsec MUST perform the following steps: - - 1. When a packet arrives, it may be tagged with the ID of the - interface (physical or virtual) via which it arrived, if - necessary, to support multiple SPDs and associated SPD-I caches. - (The interface ID is mapped to a corresponding SPD-ID.) - - 2. The packet is examined and demuxed into one of two categories: - - If the packet appears to be IPsec protected and it is addressed - to this device, an attempt is made to map it to an active SA - via the SAD. Note that the device may have multiple IP - addresses that may be used in the SAD lookup, e.g., in the case - of protocols such as SCTP. - - Traffic not addressed to this device, or addressed to this - device and not AH or ESP, is directed to SPD-I lookup. (This - implies that IKE traffic MUST have an explicit BYPASS entry in - the SPD.) If multiple SPDs are employed, the tag assigned to - the packet in step 1 is used to select the appropriate SPD-I - (and cache) to search. SPD-I lookup determines whether the - action is DISCARD or BYPASS. - - 3a. If the packet is addressed to the IPsec device and AH or ESP is - specified as the protocol, the packet is looked up in the SAD. - For unicast traffic, use only the SPI (or SPI plus protocol). - For multicast traffic, use the SPI plus the destination or SPI - plus destination and source addresses, as specified in Section - 4.1. In either case (unicast or multicast), if there is no match, - discard the traffic. This is an auditable event. The audit log - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 61] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - entry for this event SHOULD include the current date/time, SPI, - source and destination of the packet, IPsec protocol, and any - other selector values of the packet that are available. If the - packet is found in the SAD, process it accordingly (see step 4). - - 3b. If the packet is not addressed to the device or is addressed to - this device and is not AH or ESP, look up the packet header in - the (appropriate) SPD-I cache. If there is a match and the - packet is to be discarded or bypassed, do so. If there is no - cache match, look up the packet in the corresponding SPD-I and - create a cache entry as appropriate. (No SAs are created in - response to receipt of a packet that requires IPsec protection; - only BYPASS or DISCARD cache entries can be created this way.) If - there is no match, discard the traffic. This is an auditable - event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the - current date/time, SPI if available, IPsec protocol if available, - source and destination of the packet, and any other selector - values of the packet that are available. - - 3c. Processing of ICMP messages is assumed to take place on the - unprotected side of the IPsec boundary. Unprotected ICMP - messages are examined and local policy is applied to determine - whether to accept or reject these messages and, if accepted, what - action to take as a result. For example, if an ICMP unreachable - message is received, the implementation must decide whether to - act on it, reject it, or act on it with constraints. (See Section - 6.) - - 4. Apply AH or ESP processing as specified, using the SAD entry - selected in step 3a above. Then match the packet against the - inbound selectors identified by the SAD entry to verify that the - received packet is appropriate for the SA via which it was - received. - - 5. If an IPsec system receives an inbound packet on an SA and the - packet's header fields are not consistent with the selectors for - the SA, it MUST discard the packet. This is an auditable event. - The audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the current - date/time, SPI, IPsec protocol(s), source and destination of the - packet, any other selector values of the packet that are - available, and the selector values from the relevant SAD entry. - The system SHOULD also be capable of generating and sending an - IKE notification of INVALID_SELECTORS to the sender (IPsec peer), - indicating that the received packet was discarded because of - failure to pass selector checks. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 62] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - To minimize the impact of a DoS attack, or a mis-configured peer, the - IPsec system SHOULD include a management control to allow an - administrator to configure the IPsec implementation to send or not - send this IKE notification, and if this facility is selected, to rate - limit the transmission of such notifications. - - After traffic is bypassed or processed through IPsec, it is handed to - the inbound forwarding function for disposition. This function may - cause the packet to be sent (outbound) across the IPsec boundary for - additional inbound IPsec processing, e.g., in support of nested SAs. - If so, then as with ALL outbound traffic that is to be bypassed, the - packet MUST be matched against an SPD-O entry. Ultimately, the - packet should be forwarded to the destination host or process for - disposition. - -6. ICMP Processing - - This section describes IPsec handling of ICMP traffic. There are two - categories of ICMP traffic: error messages (e.g., type = destination - unreachable) and non-error messages (e.g., type = echo). This - section applies exclusively to error messages. Disposition of - non-error, ICMP messages (that are not addressed to the IPsec - implementation itself) MUST be explicitly accounted for using SPD - entries. - - The discussion in this section applies to ICMPv6 as well as to - ICMPv4. Also, a mechanism SHOULD be provided to allow an - administrator to cause ICMP error messages (selected, all, or none) - to be logged as an aid to problem diagnosis. - -6.1. Processing ICMP Error Messages Directed to an IPsec Implementation - -6.1.1. ICMP Error Messages Received on the Unprotected Side of the - Boundary - - Figure 3 in Section 5.2 shows a distinct ICMP processing module on - the unprotected side of the IPsec boundary, for processing ICMP - messages (error or otherwise) that are addressed to the IPsec device - and that are not protected via AH or ESP. An ICMP message of this - sort is unauthenticated, and its processing may result in denial or - degradation of service. This suggests that, in general, it would be - desirable to ignore such messages. However, many ICMP messages will - be received by hosts or security gateways from unauthenticated - sources, e.g., routers in the public Internet. Ignoring these ICMP - messages can degrade service, e.g., because of a failure to process - PMTU message and redirection messages. Thus, there is also a - motivation for accepting and acting upon unauthenticated ICMP - messages. - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 63] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - To accommodate both ends of this spectrum, a compliant IPsec - implementation MUST permit a local administrator to configure an - IPsec implementation to accept or reject unauthenticated ICMP - traffic. This control MUST be at the granularity of ICMP type and - MAY be at the granularity of ICMP type and code. Additionally, an - implementation SHOULD incorporate mechanisms and parameters for - dealing with such traffic. For example, there could be the ability - to establish a minimum PMTU for traffic (on a per destination basis), - to prevent receipt of an unauthenticated ICMP from setting the PMTU - to a trivial size. - - If an ICMP PMTU message passes the checks above and the system is - configured to accept it, then there are two possibilities. If the - implementation applies fragmentation on the ciphertext side of the - boundary, then the accepted PMTU information is passed to the - forwarding module (outside of the IPsec implementation), which uses - it to manage outbound packet fragmentation. If the implementation is - configured to effect plaintext side fragmentation, then the PMTU - information is passed to the plaintext side and processed as - described in Section 8.2. - -6.1.2. ICMP Error Messages Received on the Protected Side of the - Boundary - - These ICMP messages are not authenticated, but they do come from - sources on the protected side of the IPsec boundary. Thus, these - messages generally are viewed as more "trustworthy" than their - counterparts arriving from sources on the unprotected side of the - boundary. The major security concern here is that a compromised host - or router might emit erroneous ICMP error messages that could degrade - service for other devices "behind" the security gateway, or that - could even result in violations of confidentiality. For example, if - a bogus ICMP redirect were consumed by a security gateway, it could - cause the forwarding table on the protected side of the boundary to - be modified so as to deliver traffic to an inappropriate destination - "behind" the gateway. Thus, implementers MUST provide controls to - allow local administrators to constrain the processing of ICMP error - messages received on the protected side of the boundary, and directed - to the IPsec implementation. These controls are of the same type as - those employed on the unprotected side, described above in Section - 6.1.1. - -6.2. Processing Protected, Transit ICMP Error Messages - - When an ICMP error message is transmitted via an SA to a device - "behind" an IPsec implementation, both the payload and the header of - the ICMP message require checking from an access control perspective. - If one of these messages is forwarded to a host behind a security - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 64] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - gateway, the receiving host IP implementation will make decisions - based on the payload, i.e., the header of the packet that purportedly - triggered the error response. Thus, an IPsec implementation MUST be - configurable to check that this payload header information is - consistent with the SA via which it arrives. (This means that the - payload header, with source and destination address and port fields - reversed, matches the traffic selectors for the SA.) If this sort of - check is not performed, then, for example, anyone with whom the - receiving IPsec system (A) has an active SA could send an ICMP - Destination Unreachable message that refers to any host/net with - which A is currently communicating, and thus effect a highly - efficient DoS attack regarding communication with other peers of A. - Normal IPsec receiver processing of traffic is not sufficient to - protect against such attacks. However, not all contexts may require - such checks, so it is also necessary to allow a local administrator - to configure an implementation to NOT perform such checks. - - To accommodate both policies, the following convention is adopted. - If an administrator wants to allow ICMP error messages to be carried - by an SA without inspection of the payload, then configure an SPD - entry that explicitly allows for carriage of such traffic. If an - administrator wants IPsec to check the payload of ICMP error messages - for consistency, then do not create any SPD entries that accommodate - carriage of such traffic based on the ICMP packet header. This - convention motivates the following processing description. - - IPsec senders and receivers MUST support the following processing for - ICMP error messages that are sent and received via SAs. - - If an SA exists that accommodates an outbound ICMP error message, - then the message is mapped to the SA and only the IP and ICMP headers - are checked upon receipt, just as would be the case for other - traffic. If no SA exists that matches the traffic selectors - associated with an ICMP error message, then the SPD is searched to - determine if such an SA can be created. If so, the SA is created and - the ICMP error message is transmitted via that SA. Upon receipt, - this message is subject to the usual traffic selector checks at the - receiver. This processing is exactly what would happen for traffic - in general, and thus does not represent any special processing for - ICMP error messages. - - If no SA exists that would carry the outbound ICMP message in - question, and if no SPD entry would allow carriage of this outbound - ICMP error message, then an IPsec implementation MUST map the message - to the SA that would carry the return traffic associated with the - packet that triggered the ICMP error message. This requires an IPsec - implementation to detect outbound ICMP error messages that map to no - extant SA or SPD entry, and treat them specially with regard to SA - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 65] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - creation and lookup. The implementation extracts the header for the - packet that triggered the error (from the ICMP message payload), - reverses the source and destination IP address fields, extracts the - protocol field, and reverses the port fields (if accessible). It - then uses this extracted information to locate an appropriate, active - outbound SA, and transmits the error message via this SA. If no such - SA exists, no SA will be created, and this is an auditable event. - - If an IPsec implementation receives an inbound ICMP error message on - an SA, and the IP and ICMP headers of the message do not match the - traffic selectors for the SA, the receiver MUST process the received - message in a special fashion. Specifically, the receiver must - extract the header of the triggering packet from the ICMP payload, - and reverse fields as described above to determine if the packet is - consistent with the selectors for the SA via which the ICMP error - message was received. If the packet fails this check, the IPsec - implementation MUST NOT forwarded the ICMP message to the - destination. This is an auditable event. - -7. Handling Fragments (on the protected side of the IPsec boundary) - - Earlier sections of this document describe mechanisms for (a) - fragmenting an outbound packet after IPsec processing has been - applied and reassembling it at the receiver before IPsec processing - and (b) handling inbound fragments received from the unprotected side - of the IPsec boundary. This section describes how an implementation - should handle the processing of outbound plaintext fragments on the - protected side of the IPsec boundary. (See Appendix D, "Fragment - Handling Rationale".) In particular, it addresses: - - o mapping an outbound non-initial fragment to the right SA - (or finding the right SPD entry) - o verifying that a received non-initial fragment is - authorized for the SA via which it was received - o mapping outbound and inbound non-initial fragments to the - right SPD-O/SPD-I entry or the relevant cache entry, for - BYPASS/DISCARD traffic - - Note: In Section 4.1, transport mode SAs have been defined to not - carry fragments (IPv4 or IPv6). Note also that in Section 4.4.1, two - special values, ANY and OPAQUE, were defined for selectors and that - ANY includes OPAQUE. The term "non-trivial" is used to mean that the - selector has a value other than OPAQUE or ANY. - - Note: The term "non-initial fragment" is used here to indicate a - fragment that does not contain all the selector values that may be - needed for access control. As observed in Section 4.4.1, depending - on the Next Layer Protocol, in addition to Ports, the ICMP message - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 66] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - type/code or Mobility Header type could be missing from non-initial - fragments. Also, for IPv6, even the first fragment might NOT contain - the Next Layer Protocol or Ports (or ICMP message type/code, or - Mobility Header type) depending on the kind and number of extension - headers present. If a non-initial fragment contains the Port (or - ICMP type and code or Mobility Header type) but not the Next Layer - Protocol, then unless there is an SPD entry for the relevant - Local/Remote addresses with ANY for Next Layer Protocol and Port (or - ICMP type and code or Mobility Header type), the fragment would not - contain all the selector information needed for access control. - - To address the above issues, three approaches have been defined: - - o Tunnel mode SAs that carry initial and non-initial fragments - (See Section 7.1.) - o Separate tunnel mode SAs for non-initial fragments (See - Section 7.2.) - o Stateful fragment checking (See Section 7.3.) - -7.1. Tunnel Mode SAs that Carry Initial and Non-Initial Fragments - - All implementations MUST support tunnel mode SAs that are configured - to pass traffic without regard to port field (or ICMP type/code or - Mobility Header type) values. If the SA will carry traffic for - specified protocols, the selector set for the SA MUST specify the - port fields (or ICMP type/code or Mobility Header type) as ANY. An - SA defined in this fashion will carry all traffic including initial - and non-initial fragments for the indicated Local/Remote addresses - and specified Next Layer protocol(s). If the SA will carry traffic - without regard to a specific protocol value (i.e., ANY is specified - as the (Next Layer) protocol selector value), then the port field - values are undefined and MUST be set to ANY as well. (As noted in - 4.4.1, ANY includes OPAQUE as well as all specific values.) - -7.2. Separate Tunnel Mode SAs for Non-Initial Fragments - - An implementation MAY support tunnel mode SAs that will carry only - non-initial fragments, separate from non-fragmented packets and - initial fragments. The OPAQUE value will be used to specify port (or - ICMP type/code or Mobility Header type) field selectors for an SA to - carry such fragments. Receivers MUST perform a minimum offset check - on IPv4 (non-initial) fragments to protect against overlapping - fragment attacks when SAs of this type are employed. Because such - checks cannot be performed on IPv6 non-initial fragments, users and - administrators are advised that carriage of such fragments may be - dangerous, and implementers may choose to NOT support such SAs for - IPv6 traffic. Also, an SA of this sort will carry all non-initial - fragments that match a specified Local/Remote address pair and - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 67] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - protocol value, i.e., the fragments carried on this SA belong to - packets that if not fragmented, might have gone on separate SAs of - differing security. Therefore, users and administrators are advised - to protect such traffic using ESP (with integrity) and the - "strongest" integrity and encryption algorithms in use between both - peers. (Determination of the "strongest" algorithms requires - imposing an ordering of the available algorithms, a local - determination at the discretion of the initiator of the SA.) - - Specific port (or ICMP type/code or Mobility Header type) selector - values will be used to define SAs to carry initial fragments and - non-fragmented packets. This approach can be used if a user or - administrator wants to create one or more tunnel mode SAs between the - same Local/Remote addresses that discriminate based on port (or ICMP - type/code or Mobility Header type) fields. These SAs MUST have - non-trivial protocol selector values, otherwise approach #1 above - MUST be used. - - Note: In general, for the approach described in this section, one - needs only a single SA between two implementations to carry all - non-initial fragments. However, if one chooses to have multiple SAs - between the two implementations for QoS differentiation, then one - might also want multiple SAs to carry fragments-without-ports, one - for each supported QoS class. Since support for QoS via distinct SAs - is a local matter, not mandated by this document, the choice to have - multiple SAs to carry non-initial fragments should also be local. - -7.3. Stateful Fragment Checking - - An implementation MAY support some form of stateful fragment checking - for a tunnel mode SA with non-trivial port (or ICMP type/code or MH - type) field values (not ANY or OPAQUE). Implementations that will - transmit non-initial fragments on a tunnel mode SA that makes use of - non-trivial port (or ICMP type/code or MH type) selectors MUST notify - a peer via the IKE NOTIFY NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO payload. - - The peer MUST reject this proposal if it will not accept non-initial - fragments in this context. If an implementation does not - successfully negotiate transmission of non-initial fragments for such - an SA, it MUST NOT send such fragments over the SA. This standard - does not specify how peers will deal with such fragments, e.g., via - reassembly or other means, at either sender or receiver. However, a - receiver MUST discard non-initial fragments that arrive on an SA with - non-trivial port (or ICMP type/code or MH type) selector values - unless this feature has been negotiated. Also, the receiver MUST - discard non-initial fragments that do not comply with the security - policy applied to the overall packet. Discarding such packets is an - auditable event. Note that in network configurations where fragments - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 68] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - of a packet might be sent or received via different security gateways - or BITW implementations, stateful strategies for tracking fragments - may fail. - -7.4. BYPASS/DISCARD Traffic - - All implementations MUST support DISCARDing of fragments using the - normal SPD packet classification mechanisms. All implementations - MUST support stateful fragment checking to accommodate BYPASS traffic - for which a non-trivial port range is specified. The concern is that - BYPASS of a cleartext, non-initial fragment arriving at an IPsec - implementation could undermine the security afforded IPsec-protected - traffic directed to the same destination. For example, consider an - IPsec implementation configured with an SPD entry that calls for - IPsec protection of traffic between a specific source/destination - address pair, and for a specific protocol and destination port, e.g., - TCP traffic on port 23 (Telnet). Assume that the implementation also - allows BYPASS of traffic from the same source/destination address - pair and protocol, but for a different destination port, e.g., port - 119 (NNTP). An attacker could send a non-initial fragment (with a - forged source address) that, if bypassed, could overlap with - IPsec-protected traffic from the same source and thus violate the - integrity of the IPsec-protected traffic. Requiring stateful - fragment checking for BYPASS entries with non-trivial port ranges - prevents attacks of this sort. As noted above, in network - configurations where fragments of a packet might be sent or received - via different security gateways or BITW implementations, stateful - strategies for tracking fragments may fail. - -8. Path MTU/DF Processing - - The application of AH or ESP to an outbound packet increases the size - of a packet and thus may cause a packet to exceed the PMTU for the SA - via which the packet will travel. An IPsec implementation also may - receive an unprotected ICMP PMTU message and, if it chooses to act - upon the message, the result will affect outbound traffic processing. - This section describes the processing required of an IPsec - implementation to deal with these two PMTU issues. - -8.1. DF Bit - - All IPsec implementations MUST support the option of copying the DF - bit from an outbound packet to the tunnel mode header that it emits, - when traffic is carried via a tunnel mode SA. This means that it - MUST be possible to configure the implementation's treatment of the - DF bit (set, clear, copy from inner header) for each SA. This - applies to SAs where both inner and outer headers are IPv4. - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 69] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -8.2. Path MTU (PMTU) Discovery - - This section discusses IPsec handling for unprotected Path MTU - Discovery messages. ICMP PMTU is used here to refer to an ICMP - message for: - - IPv4 (RFC 792 [Pos81b]): - - Type = 3 (Destination Unreachable) - - Code = 4 (Fragmentation needed and DF set) - - Next-Hop MTU in the low-order 16 bits of the - second word of the ICMP header (labeled "unused" - in RFC 792), with high-order 16 bits set to zero) - - IPv6 (RFC 2463 [CD98]): - - Type = 2 (Packet Too Big) - - Code = 0 (Fragmentation needed) - - Next-Hop MTU in the 32-bit MTU field of the ICMP6 - message - -8.2.1. Propagation of PMTU - - When an IPsec implementation receives an unauthenticated PMTU - message, and it is configured to process (vs. ignore) such messages, - it maps the message to the SA to which it corresponds. This mapping - is effected by extracting the header information from the payload of - the PMTU message and applying the procedure described in Section 5.2. - The PMTU determined by this message is used to update the SAD PMTU - field, taking into account the size of the AH or ESP header that will - be applied, any crypto synchronization data, and the overhead imposed - by an additional IP header, in the case of a tunnel mode SA. - - In a native host implementation, it is possible to maintain PMTU data - at the same granularity as for unprotected communication, so there is - no loss of functionality. Signaling of the PMTU information is - internal to the host. For all other IPsec implementation options, - the PMTU data must be propagated via a synthesized ICMP PMTU. In - these cases, the IPsec implementation SHOULD wait for outbound - traffic to be mapped to the SAD entry. When such traffic arrives, if - the traffic would exceed the updated PMTU value the traffic MUST be - handled as follows: - - Case 1: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv4 and has the DF - bit set. The implementation SHOULD discard the packet - and send a PMTU ICMP message. - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 70] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Case 2: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv4 and has the DF - bit clear. The implementation SHOULD fragment (before or - after encryption per its configuration) and then forward - the fragments. It SHOULD NOT send a PMTU ICMP message. - - Case 3: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv6. The implementation - SHOULD discard the packet and send a PMTU ICMP message. - -8.2.2. PMTU Aging - - In all IPsec implementations, the PMTU associated with an SA MUST be - "aged" and some mechanism is required to update the PMTU in a timely - manner, especially for discovering if the PMTU is smaller than - required by current network conditions. A given PMTU has to remain - in place long enough for a packet to get from the source of the SA to - the peer, and to propagate an ICMP error message if the current PMTU - is too big. - - Implementations SHOULD use the approach described in the Path MTU - Discovery document (RFC 1191 [MD90], Section 6.3), which suggests - periodically resetting the PMTU to the first-hop data-link MTU and - then letting the normal PMTU Discovery processes update the PMTU as - necessary. The period SHOULD be configurable. - -9. Auditing - - IPsec implementations are not required to support auditing. For the - most part, the granularity of auditing is a local matter. However, - several auditable events are identified in this document, and for - each of these events a minimum set of information that SHOULD be - included in an audit log is defined. Additional information also MAY - be included in the audit log for each of these events, and additional - events, not explicitly called out in this specification, also MAY - result in audit log entries. There is no requirement for the - receiver to transmit any message to the purported transmitter in - response to the detection of an auditable event, because of the - potential to induce denial of service via such action. - -10. Conformance Requirements - - All IPv4 IPsec implementations MUST comply with all requirements of - this document. All IPv6 implementations MUST comply with all - requirements of this document. - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 71] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -11. Security Considerations - - The focus of this document is security; hence security considerations - permeate this specification. - - IPsec imposes stringent constraints on bypass of IP header data in - both directions, across the IPsec barrier, especially when tunnel - mode SAs are employed. Some constraints are absolute, while others - are subject to local administrative controls, often on a per-SA - basis. For outbound traffic, these constraints are designed to limit - covert channel bandwidth. For inbound traffic, the constraints are - designed to prevent an adversary who has the ability to tamper with - one data stream (on the unprotected side of the IPsec barrier) from - adversely affecting other data streams (on the protected side of the - barrier). The discussion in Section 5 dealing with processing DSCP - values for tunnel mode SAs illustrates this concern. - - If an IPsec implementation is configured to pass ICMP error messages - over SAs based on the ICMP header values, without checking the header - information from the ICMP message payload, serious vulnerabilities - may arise. Consider a scenario in which several sites (A, B, and C) - are connected to one another via ESP-protected tunnels: A-B, A-C, and - B-C. Also assume that the traffic selectors for each tunnel specify - ANY for protocol and port fields and IP source/destination address - ranges that encompass the address range for the systems behind the - security gateways serving each site. This would allow a host at site - B to send an ICMP Destination Unreachable message to any host at site - A, that declares all hosts on the net at site C to be unreachable. - This is a very efficient DoS attack that could have been prevented if - the ICMP error messages were subjected to the checks that IPsec - provides, if the SPD is suitably configured, as described in Section - 6.2. - -12. IANA Considerations - - The IANA has assigned the value (3) for the asn1-modules registry and - has assigned the object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.8.3.1 for the SPD - module. See Appendix C, "ASN.1 for an SPD Entry". - -13. Differences from RFC 2401 - - This architecture document differs substantially from RFC 2401 - [RFC2401] in detail and in organization, but the fundamental notions - are unchanged. - - o The processing model has been revised to address new IPsec - scenarios, improve performance, and simplify implementation. This - includes a separation between forwarding (routing) and SPD - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 72] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - selection, several SPD changes, and the addition of an outbound SPD - cache and an inbound SPD cache for bypassed or discarded traffic. - There is also a new database, the Peer Authorization Database - (PAD). This provides a link between an SA management protocol - (such as IKE) and the SPD. - - o There is no longer a requirement to support nested SAs or "SA - bundles". Instead this functionality can be achieved through SPD - and forwarding table configuration. An example of a configuration - has been added in Appendix E. - - o SPD entries were redefined to provide more flexibility. Each SPD - entry now consists of 1 to N sets of selectors, where each selector - set contains one protocol and a "list of ranges" can now be - specified for the Local IP address, Remote IP address, and whatever - fields (if any) are associated with the Next Layer Protocol (Local - Port, Remote Port, ICMP message type and code, and Mobility Header - type). An individual value for a selector is represented via a - trivial range and ANY is represented via a range than spans all - values for the selector. An example of an ASN.1 description is - included in Appendix C. - - o TOS (IPv4) and Traffic Class (IPv6) have been replaced by DSCP and - ECN. The tunnel section has been updated to explain how to handle - DSCP and ECN bits. - - o For tunnel mode SAs, an SG, BITS, or BITW implementation is now - allowed to fragment packets before applying IPsec. This applies - only to IPv4. For IPv6 packets, only the originator is allowed to - fragment them. - - o When security is desired between two intermediate systems along a - path or between an intermediate system and an end system, transport - mode may now be used between security gateways and between a - security gateway and a host. - - o This document clarifies that for all traffic that crosses the IPsec - boundary, including IPsec management traffic, the SPD or associated - caches must be consulted. - - o This document defines how to handle the situation of a security - gateway with multiple subscribers requiring separate IPsec - contexts. - - o A definition of reserved SPIs has been added. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 73] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - o Text has been added explaining why ALL IP packets must be checked - -- IPsec includes minimal firewall functionality to support access - control at the IP layer. - - o The tunnel section has been updated to clarify how to handle the IP - options field and IPv6 extension headers when constructing the - outer header. - - o SA mapping for inbound traffic has been updated to be consistent - with the changes made in AH and ESP for support of unicast and - multicast SAs. - - o Guidance has been added regarding how to handle the covert channel - created in tunnel mode by copying the DSCP value to outer header. - - o Support for AH in both IPv4 and IPv6 is no longer required. - - o PMTU handling has been updated. The appendix on - PMTU/DF/Fragmentation has been deleted. - - o Three approaches have been added for handling plaintext fragments - on the protected side of the IPsec boundary. Appendix D documents - the rationale behind them. - - o Added revised text describing how to derive selector values for SAs - (from the SPD entry or from the packet, etc.) - - o Added a new table describing the relationship between selector - values in an SPD entry, the PFP flag, and resulting selector values - in the corresponding SAD entry. - - o Added Appendix B to describe decorrelation. - - o Added text describing how to handle an outbound packet that must be - discarded. - - o Added text describing how to handle a DISCARDED inbound packet, - i.e., one that does not match the SA upon which it arrived. - - o IPv6 mobility header has been added as a possible Next Layer - Protocol. IPv6 Mobility Header message type has been added as a - selector. - - o ICMP message type and code have been added as selectors. - - o The selector "data sensitivity level" has been removed to simplify - things. - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 74] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - o Updated text describing handling ICMP error messages. The appendix - on "Categorization of ICMP Messages" has been deleted. - - o The text for the selector name has been updated and clarified. - - o The "Next Layer Protocol" has been further explained and a default - list of protocols to skip when looking for the Next Layer Protocol - has been added. - - o The text has been amended to say that this document assumes use of - IKEv2 or an SA management protocol with comparable features. - - o Text has been added clarifying the algorithm for mapping inbound - IPsec datagrams to SAs in the presence of multicast SAs. - - o The appendix "Sequence Space Window Code Example" has been removed. - - o With respect to IP addresses and ports, the terms "Local" and - "Remote" are used for policy rules (replacing source and - destination). "Local" refers to the entity being protected by an - IPsec implementation, i.e., the "source" address/port of outbound - packets or the "destination" address/port of inbound packets. - "Remote" refers to a peer entity or peer entities. The terms - "source" and "destination" are still used for packet header fields. - -14. Acknowledgements - - The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of Ran - Atkinson, who played a critical role in initial IPsec activities, and - who authored the first series of IPsec standards: RFCs 1825-1827; and - Charlie Lynn, who made significant contributions to the second series - of IPsec standards (RFCs 2401, 2402, and 2406) and to the current - versions, especially with regard to IPv6 issues. The authors also - would like to thank the members of the IPsec and MSEC working groups - who have contributed to the development of this protocol - specification. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 75] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -Appendix A: Glossary - - This section provides definitions for several key terms that are - employed in this document. Other documents provide additional - definitions and background information relevant to this technology, - e.g., [Shi00], [VK83], and [HA94]. Included in this glossary are - generic security service and security mechanism terms, plus - IPsec-specific terms. - - Access Control - A security service that prevents unauthorized use of a resource, - including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized - manner. In the IPsec context, the resource to which access is - being controlled is often: - - o for a host, computing cycles or data - o for a security gateway, a network behind the gateway - or bandwidth on that network. - - Anti-replay - See "Integrity" below. - - Authentication - Used informally to refer to the combination of two nominally - distinct security services, data origin authentication and - connectionless integrity. See the definitions below for each of - these services. - - Availability - When viewed as a security service, addresses the security concerns - engendered by attacks against networks that deny or degrade - service. For example, in the IPsec context, the use of - anti-replay mechanisms in AH and ESP support availability. - - Confidentiality - The security service that protects data from unauthorized - disclosure. The primary confidentiality concern in most instances - is unauthorized disclosure of application-level data, but - disclosure of the external characteristics of communication also - can be a concern in some circumstances. Traffic flow - confidentiality is the service that addresses this latter concern - by concealing source and destination addresses, message length, or - frequency of communication. In the IPsec context, using ESP in - tunnel mode, especially at a security gateway, can provide some - level of traffic flow confidentiality. (See also "Traffic - Analysis" below.) - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 76] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Data Origin Authentication - A security service that verifies the identity of the claimed - source of data. This service is usually bundled with - connectionless integrity service. - - Encryption - A security mechanism used to transform data from an intelligible - form (plaintext) into an unintelligible form (ciphertext), to - provide confidentiality. The inverse transformation process is - designated "decryption". Often the term "encryption" is used to - generically refer to both processes. - - Integrity - A security service that ensures that modifications to data are - detectable. Integrity comes in various flavors to match - application requirements. IPsec supports two forms of integrity: - connectionless and a form of partial sequence integrity. - Connectionless integrity is a service that detects modification of - an individual IP datagram, without regard to the ordering of the - datagram in a stream of traffic. The form of partial sequence - integrity offered in IPsec is referred to as anti-replay - integrity, and it detects arrival of duplicate IP datagrams - (within a constrained window). This is in contrast to - connection-oriented integrity, which imposes more stringent - sequencing requirements on traffic, e.g., to be able to detect - lost or re-ordered messages. Although authentication and - integrity services often are cited separately, in practice they - are intimately connected and almost always offered in tandem. - - Protected vs. Unprotected - "Protected" refers to the systems or interfaces that are inside - the IPsec protection boundary, and "unprotected" refers to the - systems or interfaces that are outside the IPsec protection - boundary. IPsec provides a boundary through which traffic passes. - There is an asymmetry to this barrier, which is reflected in the - processing model. Outbound data, if not discarded or bypassed, is - protected via the application of AH or ESP and the addition of the - corresponding headers. Inbound data, if not discarded or - bypassed, is processed via the removal of AH or ESP headers. In - this document, inbound traffic enters an IPsec implementation from - the "unprotected" interface. Outbound traffic enters the - implementation via the "protected" interface, or is internally - generated by the implementation on the "protected" side of the - boundary and directed toward the "unprotected" interface. An - IPsec implementation may support more than one interface on either - or both sides of the boundary. The protected interface may be - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 77] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - internal, e.g., in a host implementation of IPsec. The protected - interface may link to a socket layer interface presented by the - OS. - - Security Association (SA) - A simplex (uni-directional) logical connection, created for - security purposes. All traffic traversing an SA is provided the - same security processing. In IPsec, an SA is an Internet-layer - abstraction implemented through the use of AH or ESP. State data - associated with an SA is represented in the SA Database (SAD). - - Security Gateway - An intermediate system that acts as the communications interface - between two networks. The set of hosts (and networks) on the - external side of the security gateway is termed unprotected (they - are generally at least less protected than those "behind" the SG), - while the networks and hosts on the internal side are viewed as - protected. The internal subnets and hosts served by a security - gateway are presumed to be trusted by virtue of sharing a common, - local, security administration. In the IPsec context, a security - gateway is a point at which AH and/or ESP is implemented in order - to serve a set of internal hosts, providing security services for - these hosts when they communicate with external hosts also - employing IPsec (either directly or via another security gateway). - - Security Parameters Index (SPI) - An arbitrary 32-bit value that is used by a receiver to identify - the SA to which an incoming packet should be bound. For a unicast - SA, the SPI can be used by itself to specify an SA, or it may be - used in conjunction with the IPsec protocol type. Additional IP - address information is used to identify multicast SAs. The SPI is - carried in AH and ESP protocols to enable the receiving system to - select the SA under which a received packet will be processed. An - SPI has only local significance, as defined by the creator of the - SA (usually the receiver of the packet carrying the SPI); thus an - SPI is generally viewed as an opaque bit string. However, the - creator of an SA may choose to interpret the bits in an SPI to - facilitate local processing. - - Traffic Analysis - The analysis of network traffic flow for the purpose of deducing - information that is useful to an adversary. Examples of such - information are frequency of transmission, the identities of the - conversing parties, sizes of packets, and flow identifiers - [Sch94]. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 78] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -Appendix B: Decorrelation - - This appendix is based on work done for caching of policies in the IP - Security Policy Working Group by Luis Sanchez, Matt Condell, and John - Zao. - - Two SPD entries are correlated if there is a non-null intersection - between the values of corresponding selectors in each entry. Caching - correlated SPD entries can lead to incorrect policy enforcement. A - solution to this problem, which still allows for caching, is to - remove the ambiguities by decorrelating the entries. That is, the - SPD entries must be rewritten so that for every pair of entries there - exists a selector for which there is a null intersection between the - values in both of the entries. Once the entries are decorrelated, - there is no longer any ordering requirement on them, since only one - entry will match any lookup. The next section describes - decorrelation in more detail and presents an algorithm that may be - used to implement decorrelation. - -B.1. Decorrelation Algorithm - - The basic decorrelation algorithm takes each entry in a correlated - SPD and divides it into a set of entries using a tree structure. - The nodes of the tree are the selectors that may overlap between the - policies. At each node, the algorithm creates a branch for each of - the values of the selector. It also creates one branch for the - complement of the union of all selector values. Policies are then - formed by traversing the tree from the root to each leaf. The - policies at the leaves are compared to the set of already - decorrelated policy rules. Each policy at a leaf is either - completely overridden by a policy in the already decorrelated set and - is discarded or is decorrelated with all the policies in the - decorrelated set and is added to it. - - The basic algorithm does not guarantee an optimal set of decorrelated - entries. That is, the entries may be broken up into smaller sets - than is necessary, though they will still provide all the necessary - policy information. Some extensions to the basic algorithm are - described later to improve this and improve the performance of the - algorithm. - - C A set of ordered, correlated entries (a correlated SPD). - Ci The ith entry in C. - U The set of decorrelated entries being built from C. - Ui The ith entry in U. - Sik The kth selection for policy Ci. - Ai The action for policy Ci. - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 79] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - A policy (SPD entry) P may be expressed as a sequence of selector - values and an action (BYPASS, DISCARD, or PROTECT): - - Ci = Si1 x Si2 x ... x Sik -> Ai - - 1) Put C1 in set U as U1 - - For each policy Cj (j > 1) in C - - 2) If Cj is decorrelated with every entry in U, then add it to U. - - 3) If Cj is correlated with one or more entries in U, create a tree - rooted at the policy Cj that partitions Cj into a set of decorrelated - entries. The algorithm starts with a root node where no selectors - have yet been chosen. - - A) Choose a selector in Cj, Sjn, that has not yet been chosen when - traversing the tree from the root to this node. If there are no - selectors not yet used, continue to the next unfinished branch - until all branches have been completed. When the tree is - completed, go to step D. - - T is the set of entries in U that are correlated with the entry - at this node. - - The entry at this node is the entry formed by the selector - values of each of the branches between the root and this node. - Any selector values that are not yet represented by branches - assume the corresponding selector value in Cj, since the values - in Cj represent the maximum value for each selector. - - B) Add a branch to the tree for each value of the selector Sjn that - appears in any of the entries in T. (If the value is a superset - of the value of Sjn in Cj, then use the value in Cj, since that - value represents the universal set.) Also add a branch for the - complement of the union of all the values of the selector Sjn - in T. When taking the complement, remember that the universal - set is the value of Sjn in Cj. A branch need not be created - for the null set. - - C) Repeat A and B until the tree is completed. - - D) The entry to each leaf now represents an entry that is a subset - of Cj. The entries at the leaves completely partition Cj in - such a way that each entry is either completely overridden by - an entry in U, or is decorrelated with the entries in U. - - Add all the decorrelated entries at the leaves of the tree to U. - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 80] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - 4) Get next Cj and go to 2. - - 5) When all entries in C have been processed, then U will contain an - decorrelated version of C. - - There are several optimizations that can be made to this algorithm. - A few of them are presented here. - - It is possible to optimize, or at least improve, the amount of - branching that occurs by carefully choosing the order of the - selectors used for the next branch. For example, if a selector Sjn - can be chosen so that all the values for that selector in T are equal - to or a superset of the value of Sjn in Cj, then only a single branch - needs to be created (since the complement will be null). - - Branches of the tree do not have to proceed with the entire - decorrelation algorithm. For example, if a node represents an entry - that is decorrelated with all the entries in U, then there is no - reason to continue decorrelating that branch. Also, if a branch is - completely overridden by an entry in U, then there is no reason to - continue decorrelating the branch. - - An additional optimization is to check to see if a branch is - overridden by one of the CORRELATED entries in set C that has already - been decorrelated. That is, if the branch is part of decorrelating - Cj, then check to see if it was overridden by an entry Cm, m < j. - This is a valid check, since all the entries Cm are already expressed - in U. - - Along with checking if an entry is already decorrelated in step 2, - check if Cj is overridden by any entry in U. If it is, skip it since - it is not relevant. An entry x is overridden by another entry y if - every selector in x is equal to or a subset of the corresponding - selector in entry y. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 81] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -Appendix C: ASN.1 for an SPD Entry - - This appendix is included as an additional way to describe SPD - entries, as defined in Section 4.4.1. It uses ASN.1 syntax that has - been successfully compiled. This syntax is merely illustrative and - need not be employed in an implementation to achieve compliance. The - SPD description in Section 4.4.1 is normative. - - SPDModule - - {iso(1) org (3) dod (6) internet (1) security (5) mechanisms (5) - ipsec (8) asn1-modules (3) spd-module (1) } - - DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= - - BEGIN - - IMPORTS - RDNSequence FROM PKIX1Explicit88 - { iso(1) identified-organization(3) - dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) - id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ; - - -- An SPD is a list of policies in decreasing order of preference - SPD ::= SEQUENCE OF SPDEntry - - SPDEntry ::= CHOICE { - iPsecEntry IPsecEntry, -- PROTECT traffic - bypassOrDiscard [0] BypassOrDiscardEntry } -- DISCARD/BYPASS - - IPsecEntry ::= SEQUENCE { -- Each entry consists of - name NameSets OPTIONAL, - pFPs PacketFlags, -- Populate from packet flags - -- Applies to ALL of the corresponding - -- traffic selectors in the SelectorLists - condition SelectorLists, -- Policy "condition" - processing Processing -- Policy "action" - } - - BypassOrDiscardEntry ::= SEQUENCE { - bypass BOOLEAN, -- TRUE BYPASS, FALSE DISCARD - condition InOutBound } - - InOutBound ::= CHOICE { - outbound [0] SelectorLists, - inbound [1] SelectorLists, - bothways [2] BothWays } - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 82] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - BothWays ::= SEQUENCE { - inbound SelectorLists, - outbound SelectorLists } - - NameSets ::= SEQUENCE { - passed SET OF Names-R, -- Matched to IKE ID by - -- responder - local SET OF Names-I } -- Used internally by IKE - -- initiator - - Names-R ::= CHOICE { -- IKEv2 IDs - dName RDNSequence, -- ID_DER_ASN1_DN - fqdn FQDN, -- ID_FQDN - rfc822 [0] RFC822Name, -- ID_RFC822_ADDR - keyID OCTET STRING } -- KEY_ID - - Names-I ::= OCTET STRING -- Used internally by IKE - -- initiator - - FQDN ::= IA5String - - RFC822Name ::= IA5String - - PacketFlags ::= BIT STRING { - -- if set, take selector value from packet - -- establishing SA - -- else use value in SPD entry - localAddr (0), - remoteAddr (1), - protocol (2), - localPort (3), - remotePort (4) } - - SelectorLists ::= SET OF SelectorList - - SelectorList ::= SEQUENCE { - localAddr AddrList, - remoteAddr AddrList, - protocol ProtocolChoice } - - Processing ::= SEQUENCE { - extSeqNum BOOLEAN, -- TRUE 64 bit counter, FALSE 32 bit - seqOverflow BOOLEAN, -- TRUE rekey, FALSE terminate & audit - fragCheck BOOLEAN, -- TRUE stateful fragment checking, - -- FALSE no stateful fragment checking - lifetime SALifetime, - spi ManualSPI, - algorithms ProcessingAlgs, - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 83] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - tunnel TunnelOptions OPTIONAL } -- if absent, use - -- transport mode - - SALifetime ::= SEQUENCE { - seconds [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL, - bytes [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL } - - ManualSPI ::= SEQUENCE { - spi INTEGER, - keys KeyIDs } - - KeyIDs ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING - - ProcessingAlgs ::= CHOICE { - ah [0] IntegrityAlgs, -- AH - esp [1] ESPAlgs} -- ESP - - ESPAlgs ::= CHOICE { - integrity [0] IntegrityAlgs, -- integrity only - confidentiality [1] ConfidentialityAlgs, -- confidentiality - -- only - both [2] IntegrityConfidentialityAlgs, - combined [3] CombinedModeAlgs } - - IntegrityConfidentialityAlgs ::= SEQUENCE { - integrity IntegrityAlgs, - confidentiality ConfidentialityAlgs } - - -- Integrity Algorithms, ordered by decreasing preference - IntegrityAlgs ::= SEQUENCE OF IntegrityAlg - - -- Confidentiality Algorithms, ordered by decreasing preference - ConfidentialityAlgs ::= SEQUENCE OF ConfidentialityAlg - - -- Integrity Algorithms - IntegrityAlg ::= SEQUENCE { - algorithm IntegrityAlgType, - parameters ANY -- DEFINED BY algorithm -- OPTIONAL } - - IntegrityAlgType ::= INTEGER { - none (0), - auth-HMAC-MD5-96 (1), - auth-HMAC-SHA1-96 (2), - auth-DES-MAC (3), - auth-KPDK-MD5 (4), - auth-AES-XCBC-96 (5) - -- tbd (6..65535) - } - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 84] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - -- Confidentiality Algorithms - ConfidentialityAlg ::= SEQUENCE { - algorithm ConfidentialityAlgType, - parameters ANY -- DEFINED BY algorithm -- OPTIONAL } - - ConfidentialityAlgType ::= INTEGER { - encr-DES-IV64 (1), - encr-DES (2), - encr-3DES (3), - encr-RC5 (4), - encr-IDEA (5), - encr-CAST (6), - encr-BLOWFISH (7), - encr-3IDEA (8), - encr-DES-IV32 (9), - encr-RC4 (10), - encr-NULL (11), - encr-AES-CBC (12), - encr-AES-CTR (13) - -- tbd (14..65535) - } - - CombinedModeAlgs ::= SEQUENCE OF CombinedModeAlg - - CombinedModeAlg ::= SEQUENCE { - algorithm CombinedModeType, - parameters ANY -- DEFINED BY algorithm} -- defined outside - -- of this document for AES modes. - - CombinedModeType ::= INTEGER { - comb-AES-CCM (1), - comb-AES-GCM (2) - -- tbd (3..65535) - } - - TunnelOptions ::= SEQUENCE { - dscp DSCP, - ecn BOOLEAN, -- TRUE Copy CE to inner header - df DF, - addresses TunnelAddresses } - - TunnelAddresses ::= CHOICE { - ipv4 IPv4Pair, - ipv6 [0] IPv6Pair } - - IPv4Pair ::= SEQUENCE { - local OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)), - remote OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)) } - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 85] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - IPv6Pair ::= SEQUENCE { - local OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), - remote OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) } - - DSCP ::= SEQUENCE { - copy BOOLEAN, -- TRUE copy from inner header - -- FALSE do not copy - mapping OCTET STRING OPTIONAL} -- points to table - -- if no copy - - DF ::= INTEGER { - clear (0), - set (1), - copy (2) } - - ProtocolChoice::= CHOICE { - anyProt AnyProtocol, -- for ANY protocol - noNext [0] NoNextLayerProtocol, -- has no next layer - -- items - oneNext [1] OneNextLayerProtocol, -- has one next layer - -- item - twoNext [2] TwoNextLayerProtocol, -- has two next layer - -- items - fragment FragmentNoNext } -- has no next layer - -- info - - AnyProtocol ::= SEQUENCE { - id INTEGER (0), -- ANY protocol - nextLayer AnyNextLayers } - - AnyNextLayers ::= SEQUENCE { -- with either - first AnyNextLayer, -- ANY next layer selector - second AnyNextLayer } -- ANY next layer selector - - NoNextLayerProtocol ::= INTEGER (2..254) - - FragmentNoNext ::= INTEGER (44) -- Fragment identifier - - OneNextLayerProtocol ::= SEQUENCE { - id INTEGER (1..254), -- ICMP, MH, ICMPv6 - nextLayer NextLayerChoice } -- ICMP Type*256+Code - -- MH Type*256 - - TwoNextLayerProtocol ::= SEQUENCE { - id INTEGER (2..254), -- Protocol - local NextLayerChoice, -- Local and - remote NextLayerChoice } -- Remote ports - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 86] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - NextLayerChoice ::= CHOICE { - any AnyNextLayer, - opaque [0] OpaqueNextLayer, - range [1] NextLayerRange } - - -- Representation of ANY in next layer field - AnyNextLayer ::= SEQUENCE { - start INTEGER (0), - end INTEGER (65535) } - - -- Representation of OPAQUE in next layer field. - -- Matches IKE convention - OpaqueNextLayer ::= SEQUENCE { - start INTEGER (65535), - end INTEGER (0) } - - -- Range for a next layer field - NextLayerRange ::= SEQUENCE { - start INTEGER (0..65535), - end INTEGER (0..65535) } - - -- List of IP addresses - AddrList ::= SEQUENCE { - v4List IPv4List OPTIONAL, - v6List [0] IPv6List OPTIONAL } - - -- IPv4 address representations - IPv4List ::= SEQUENCE OF IPv4Range - - IPv4Range ::= SEQUENCE { -- close, but not quite right ... - ipv4Start OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)), - ipv4End OCTET STRING (SIZE (4)) } - - -- IPv6 address representations - IPv6List ::= SEQUENCE OF IPv6Range - - IPv6Range ::= SEQUENCE { -- close, but not quite right ... - ipv6Start OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)), - ipv6End OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)) } - - END - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 87] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -Appendix D: Fragment Handling Rationale - - There are three issues that must be resolved regarding processing of - (plaintext) fragments in IPsec: - - - mapping a non-initial, outbound fragment to the right SA - (or finding the right SPD entry) - - verifying that a received, non-initial fragment is authorized - for the SA via which it is received - - mapping outbound and inbound non-initial fragments to the - right SPD/cache entry, for BYPASS/DISCARD traffic - - The first and third issues arise because we need a deterministic - algorithm for mapping traffic to SAs (and SPD/cache entries). All - three issues are important because we want to make sure that - non-initial fragments that cross the IPsec boundary do not cause the - access control policies in place at the receiver (or transmitter) to - be violated. - -D.1. Transport Mode and Fragments - - First, we note that transport mode SAs have been defined to not carry - fragments. This is a carryover from RFC 2401, where transport mode - SAs always terminated at endpoints. This is a fundamental - requirement because, in the worst case, an IPv4 fragment to which - IPsec was applied might then be fragmented (as a ciphertext packet), - en route to the destination. IP fragment reassembly procedures at - the IPsec receiver would not be able to distinguish between pre-IPsec - fragments and fragments created after IPsec processing. - - For IPv6, only the sender is allowed to fragment a packet. As for - IPv4, an IPsec implementation is allowed to fragment tunnel mode - packets after IPsec processing, because it is the sender relative to - the (outer) tunnel header. However, unlike IPv4, it would be - feasible to carry a plaintext fragment on a transport mode SA, - because the fragment header in IPv6 would appear after the AH or ESP - header, and thus would not cause confusion at the receiver with - respect to reassembly. Specifically, the receiver would not attempt - reassembly for the fragment until after IPsec processing. To keep - things simple, this specification prohibits carriage of fragments on - transport mode SAs for IPv6 traffic. - - When only end systems used transport mode SAs, the prohibition on - carriage of fragments was not a problem, since we assumed that the - end system could be configured to not offer a fragment to IPsec. For - a native host implementation, this seems reasonable, and, as someone - already noted, RFC 2401 warned that a BITS implementation might have - to reassemble fragments before performing an SA lookup. (It would - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 88] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - then apply AH or ESP and could re-fragment the packet after IPsec - processing.) Because a BITS implementation is assumed to be able to - have access to all traffic emanating from its host, even if the host - has multiple interfaces, this was deemed a reasonable mandate. - - In this specification, it is acceptable to use transport mode in - cases where the IPsec implementation is not the ultimate destination, - e.g., between two SGs. In principle, this creates a new opportunity - for outbound, plaintext fragments to be mapped to a transport mode SA - for IPsec processing. However, in these new contexts in which a - transport mode SA is now approved for use, it seems likely that we - can continue to prohibit transmission of fragments, as seen by IPsec, - i.e., packets that have an "outer header" with a non-zero fragment - offset field. For example, in an IP overlay network, packets being - sent over transport mode SAs are IP-in-IP tunneled and thus have the - necessary inner header to accommodate fragmentation prior to IPsec - processing. When carried via a transport mode SA, IPsec would not - examine the inner IP header for such traffic, and thus would not - consider the packet to be a fragment. - -D.2. Tunnel Mode and Fragments - - For tunnel mode SAs, it has always been the case that outbound - fragments might arrive for processing at an IPsec implementation. - The need to accommodate fragmented outbound packets can pose a - problem because a non-initial fragment generally will not contain the - port fields associated with a next layer protocol such as TCP, UDP, - or SCTP. Thus, depending on the SPD configuration for a given IPsec - implementation, plaintext fragments might or might not pose a - problem. - - For example, if the SPD requires that all traffic between two address - ranges is offered IPsec protection (no BYPASS or DISCARD SPD entries - apply to this address range), then it should be easy to carry - non-initial fragments on the SA defined for this address range, since - the SPD entry implies an intent to carry ALL traffic between the - address ranges. But, if there are multiple SPD entries that could - match a fragment, and if these entries reference different subsets of - port fields (vs. ANY), then it is not possible to map an outbound - non-initial fragment to the right entry, unambiguously. (If we choose - to allow carriage of fragments on transport mode SAs for IPv6, the - problems arises in that context as well.) - - This problem largely, though not exclusively, motivated the - definition of OPAQUE as a selector value for port fields in RFC 2401. - The other motivation for OPAQUE is the observation that port fields - might not be accessible due to the prior application of IPsec. For - example, if a host applied IPsec to its traffic and that traffic - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 89] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - arrived at an SG, these fields would be encrypted. The algorithm - specified for locating the "next layer protocol" described in RFC - 2401 also motivated use of OPAQUE to accommodate an encrypted next - layer protocol field in such circumstances. Nonetheless, the primary - use of the OPAQUE value was to match traffic selector fields in - packets that did not contain port fields (non-initial fragments), or - packets in which the port fields were already encrypted (as a result - of nested application of IPsec). RFC 2401 was ambiguous in - discussing the use of OPAQUE vs. ANY, suggesting in some places that - ANY might be an alternative to OPAQUE. - - We gain additional access control capability by defining both ANY and - OPAQUE values. OPAQUE can be defined to match only fields that are - not accessible. We could define ANY as the complement of OPAQUE, - i.e., it would match all values but only for accessible port fields. - We have therefore simplified the procedure employed to locate the - next layer protocol in this document, so that we treat ESP and AH as - next layer protocols. As a result, the notion of an encrypted next - layer protocol field has vanished, and there is also no need to worry - about encrypted port fields either. And accordingly, OPAQUE will be - applicable only to non-initial fragments. - - Since we have adopted the definitions above for ANY and OPAQUE, we - need to clarify how these values work when the specified protocol - does not have port fields, and when ANY is used for the protocol - selector. Accordingly, if a specific protocol value is used as a - selector, and if that protocol has no port fields, then the port - field selectors are to be ignored and ANY MUST be specified as the - value for the port fields. (In this context, ICMP TYPE and CODE - values are lumped together as a single port field (for IKEv2 - negotiation), as is the IPv6 Mobility Header TYPE value.) If the - protocol selector is ANY, then this should be treated as equivalent - to specifying a protocol for which no port fields are defined, and - thus the port selectors should be ignored, and MUST be set to ANY. - -D.3. The Problem of Non-Initial Fragments - - For an SG implementation, it is obvious that fragments might arrive - from end systems behind the SG. A BITW implementation also may - encounter fragments from a host or gateway behind it. (As noted - earlier, native host implementations and BITS implementations - probably can avoid the problems described below.) In the worst case, - fragments from a packet might arrive at distinct BITW or SG - instantiations and thus preclude reassembly as a solution option. - Hence, in RFC 2401 we adopted a general requirement that fragments - must be accommodated in tunnel mode for all implementations. However, - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 90] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - RFC 2401 did not provide a perfect solution. The use of OPAQUE as a - selector value for port fields (a SHOULD in RFC 2401) allowed an SA - to carry non-initial fragments. - - Using the features defined in RFC 2401, if one defined an SA between - two IPsec (SG or BITW) implementations using the OPAQUE value for - both port fields, then all non-initial fragments matching the - source/destination (S/D) address and protocol values for the SA would - be mapped to that SA. Initial fragments would NOT map to this SA, if - we adopt a strict definition of OPAQUE. However, RFC 2401 did not - provide detailed guidance on this and thus it may not have been - apparent that use of this feature would essentially create a - "non-initial fragment only" SA. - - In the course of discussing the "fragment-only" SA approach, it was - noted that some subtle problems, problems not considered in RFC 2401, - would have to be avoided. For example, an SA of this sort must be - configured to offer the "highest quality" security services for any - traffic between the indicated S/D addresses (for the specified - protocol). This is necessary to ensure that any traffic captured by - the fragment-only SA is not offered degraded security relative to - what it would have been offered if the packet were not fragmented. A - possible problem here is that we may not be able to identify the - "highest quality" security services defined for use between two IPsec - implementation, since the choice of security protocols, options, and - algorithms is a lattice, not a totally ordered set. (We might safely - say that BYPASS < AH < ESP w/integrity, but it gets complicated if we - have multiple ESP encryption or integrity algorithm options.) So, one - has to impose a total ordering on these security parameters to make - this work, but this can be done locally. - - However, this conservative strategy has a possible performance - downside. If most traffic traversing an IPsec implementation for a - given S/D address pair (and specified protocol) is bypassed, then a - fragment-only SA for that address pair might cause a dramatic - increase in the volume of traffic afforded crypto processing. If the - crypto implementation cannot support high traffic rates, this could - cause problems. (An IPsec implementation that is capable of line rate - or near line rate crypto performance would not be adversely affected - by this SA configuration approach. Nonetheless, the performance - impact is a potential concern, specific to implementation - capabilities.) - - Another concern is that non-initial fragments sent over a dedicated - SA might be used to effect overlapping reassembly attacks, when - combined with an apparently acceptable initial fragment. (This sort - of attack assumes creation of bogus fragments and is not a side - effect of normal fragmentation.) This concern is easily addressed in - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 91] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - IPv4, by checking the fragment offset value to ensure that no - non-initial fragments have a small enough offset to overlap port - fields that should be contained in the initial fragment. Recall that - the IPv4 MTU minimum is 576 bytes, and the max IP header length is 60 - bytes, so any ports should be present in the initial fragment. If we - require all non-initial fragments to have an offset of, say, 128 or - greater, just to be on the safe side, this should prevent successful - attacks of this sort. If the intent is only to protect against this - sort of reassembly attack, this check need be implemented only by a - receiver. - - IPv6 also has a fragment offset, carried in the fragmentation - extension header. However, IPv6 extension headers are variable in - length and there is no analogous max header length value that we can - use to check non-initial fragments, to reject ones that might be used - for an attack of the sort noted above. A receiver would need to - maintain state analogous to reassembly state, to provide equivalent - protection. So, only for IPv4 is it feasible to impose a fragment - offset check that would reject attacks designed to circumvent port - field checks by IPsec (or firewalls) when passing non-initial - fragments. - - Another possible concern is that in some topologies and SPD - configurations this approach might result in an access control - surprise. The notion is that if we create an SA to carry ALL - (non-initial) fragments, then that SA would carry some traffic that - might otherwise arrive as plaintext via a separate path, e.g., a path - monitored by a proxy firewall. But, this concern arises only if the - other path allows initial fragments to traverse it without requiring - reassembly, presumably a bad idea for a proxy firewall. Nonetheless, - this does represent a potential problem in some topologies and under - certain assumptions with respect to SPD and (other) firewall rule - sets, and administrators need to be warned of this possibility. - - A less serious concern is that non-initial fragments sent over a - non-initial fragment-only SA might represent a DoS opportunity, in - that they could be sent when no valid, initial fragment will ever - arrive. This might be used to attack hosts behind an SG or BITW - device. However, the incremental risk posed by this sort of attack, - which can be mounted only by hosts behind an SG or BITW device, seems - small. - - If we interpret the ANY selector value as encompassing OPAQUE, then a - single SA with ANY values for both port fields would be able to - accommodate all traffic matching the S/D address and protocol traffic - selectors, an alternative to using the OPAQUE value. But, using ANY - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 92] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - here precludes multiple, distinct SAs between the same IPsec - implementations for the same address pairs and protocol. So, it is - not an exactly equivalent alternative. - - Fundamentally, fragment handling problems arise only when more than - one SA is defined with the same S/D address and protocol selector - values, but with different port field selector values. - -D.4. BYPASS/DISCARD Traffic - - We also have to address the non-initial fragment processing issue for - BYPASS/DISCARD entries, independent of SA processing. This is - largely a local matter for two reasons: - - 1) We have no means for coordinating SPD entries for such - traffic between IPsec implementations since IKE is not - invoked. - 2) Many of these entries refer to traffic that is NOT - directed to or received from a location that is using - IPsec. So there is no peer IPsec implementation with - which to coordinate via any means. - - However, this document should provide guidance here, consistent with - our goal of offering a well-defined, access control function for all - traffic, relative to the IPsec boundary. To that end, this document - says that implementations MUST support fragment reassembly for - BYPASS/DISCARD traffic when port fields are specified. An - implementation also MUST permit a user or administrator to accept - such traffic or reject such traffic using the SPD conventions - described in Section 4.4.1. The concern is that BYPASS of a - cleartext, non-initial fragment arriving at an IPsec implementation - could undermine the security afforded IPsec-protected traffic - directed to the same destination. For example, consider an IPsec - implementation configured with an SPD entry that calls for - IPsec-protection of traffic between a specific source/destination - address pair, and for a specific protocol and destination port, e.g., - TCP traffic on port 23 (Telnet). Assume that the implementation also - allows BYPASS of traffic from the same source/destination address - pair and protocol, but for a different destination port, e.g., port - 119 (NNTP). An attacker could send a non-initial fragment (with a - forged source address) that, if bypassed, could overlap with - IPsec-protected traffic from the same source and thus violate the - integrity of the IPsec-protected traffic. Requiring stateful - fragment checking for BYPASS entries with non-trivial port ranges - prevents attacks of this sort. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 93] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -D.5. Just say no to ports? - - It has been suggested that we could avoid the problems described - above by not allowing port field selectors to be used in tunnel mode. - But the discussion above shows this to be an unnecessarily stringent - approach, i.e., since no problems arise for the native OS and BITS - implementations. Moreover, some WG members have described scenarios - where use of tunnel mode SAs with (non-trivial) port field selectors - is appropriate. So the challenge is defining a strategy that can - deal with this problem in BITW and SG contexts. Also note that - BYPASS/DISCARD entries in the SPD that make use of ports pose the - same problems, irrespective of tunnel vs. transport mode notions. - - Some folks have suggested that a firewall behind an SG or BITW should - be left to enforce port-level access controls and the effects of - fragmentation. However, this seems to be an incongruous suggestion - in that elsewhere in IPsec (e.g., in IKE payloads) we are concerned - about firewalls that always discard fragments. If many firewalls - don't pass fragments in general, why should we expect them to deal - with fragments in this case? So, this analysis rejects the suggestion - of disallowing use of port field selectors with tunnel mode SAs. - -D.6. Other Suggested Solutions - - One suggestion is to reassemble fragments at the sending IPsec - implementation, and thus avoid the problem entirely. This approach - is invisible to a receiver and thus could be adopted as a purely - local implementation option. - - A more sophisticated version of this suggestion calls for - establishing and maintaining minimal state from each initial fragment - encountered, to allow non-initial fragments to be matched to the - right SAs or SPD/cache entries. This implies an extension to the - current processing model (and the old one). The IPsec implementation - would intercept all fragments; capture Source/Destination IP - addresses, protocol, packet ID, and port fields from initial - fragments; and then use this data to map non-initial fragments to SAs - that require port fields. If this approach is employed, the receiver - needs to employ an equivalent scheme, as it too must verify that - received fragments are consistent with SA selector values. A - non-initial fragment that arrives prior to an initial fragment could - be cached or discarded, awaiting arrival of the corresponding initial - fragment. - - A downside of both approaches noted above is that they will not - always work. When a BITW device or SG is configured in a topology - that might allow some fragments for a packet to be processed at - different SGs or BITW devices, then there is no guarantee that all - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 94] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - fragments will ever arrive at the same IPsec device. This approach - also raises possible processing problems. If the sender caches - non-initial fragments until the corresponding initial fragment - arrives, buffering problems might arise, especially at high speeds. - If the non-initial fragments are discarded rather than cached, there - is no guarantee that traffic will ever pass, e.g., retransmission - will result in different packet IDs that cannot be matched with prior - transmissions. In any case, housekeeping procedures will be needed - to decide when to delete the fragment state data, adding some - complexity to the system. Nonetheless, this is a viable solution in - some topologies, and these are likely to be common topologies. - - The Working Group rejected an earlier version of the convention of - creating an SA to carry only non-initial fragments, something that - was supported implicitly under the RFC 2401 model via use of OPAQUE - port fields, but never clearly articulated in RFC 2401. The - (rejected) text called for each non-initial fragment to be treated as - protocol 44 (the IPv6 fragment header protocol ID) by the sender and - receiver. This approach has the potential to make IPv4 and IPv6 - fragment handling more uniform, but it does not fundamentally change - the problem, nor does it address the issue of fragment handling for - BYPASS/DISCARD traffic. Given the fragment overlap attack problem - that IPv6 poses, it does not seem that it is worth the effort to - adopt this strategy. - -D.7. Consistency - - Earlier, the WG agreed to allow an IPsec BITS, BITW, or SG to perform - fragmentation prior to IPsec processing. If this fragmentation is - performed after SA lookup at the sender, there is no "mapping to the - right SA" problem. But, the receiver still needs to be able to - verify that the non-initial fragments are consistent with the SA via - which they are received. Since the initial fragment might be lost en - route, the receiver encounters all of the potential problems noted - above. Thus, if we are to be consistent in our decisions, we need to - say how a receiver will deal with the non-initial fragments that - arrive. - -D.8. Conclusions - - There is no simple, uniform way to handle fragments in all contexts. - Different approaches work better in different contexts. Thus, this - document offers 3 choices -- one MUST and two MAYs. At some point in - the future, if the community gains experience with the two MAYs, they - may become SHOULDs or MUSTs or other approaches may be proposed. - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 95] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -Appendix E: Example of Supporting Nested SAs via SPD and Forwarding - Table Entries - - This appendix provides an example of how to configure the SPD and - forwarding tables to support a nested pair of SAs, consistent with - the new processing model. For simplicity, this example assumes just - one SPD-I. - - The goal in this example is to support a transport mode SA from A to - C, carried over a tunnel mode SA from A to B. For example, A might - be a laptop connected to the public Internet, B might be a firewall - that protects a corporate network, and C might be a server on the - corporate network that demands end-to-end authentication of A's - traffic. - - +---+ +---+ +---+ - | A |=====| B | | C | - | |------------| | - | |=====| | | | - +---+ +---+ +---+ - - A's SPD contains entries of the form: - - Next Layer - Rule Local Remote Protocol Action - ---- ----- ------ ---------- ----------------------- - 1 C A ESP BYPASS - 2 A C ICMP,ESP PROTECT(ESP,tunnel,integr+conf) - 3 A C ANY PROTECT(ESP,transport,integr-only) - 4 A B ICMP,IKE BYPASS - - A's unprotected-side forwarding table is set so that outbound packets - destined for C are looped back to the protected side. A's - protected-side forwarding table is set so that inbound ESP packets - are looped back to the unprotected side. A's forwarding tables - contain entries of the form: - - Unprotected-side forwarding table - - Rule Local Remote Protocol Action - ---- ----- ------ -------- --------------------------- - 1 A C ANY loop back to protected side - 2 A B ANY forward to B - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 96] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - Protected-side forwarding table - - Rule Local Remote Protocol Action - ---- ----- ------ -------- ----------------------------- - 1 A C ESP loop back to unprotected side - - An outbound TCP packet from A to C would match SPD rule 3 and have - transport mode ESP applied to it. The unprotected-side forwarding - table would then loop back the packet. The packet is compared - against SPD-I (see Figure 2), matches SPD rule 1, and so it is - BYPASSed. The packet is treated as an outbound packet and compared - against the SPD for a third time. This time it matches SPD rule 2, - so ESP is applied in tunnel mode. This time the forwarding table - doesn't loop back the packet, because the outer destination address - is B, so the packet goes out onto the wire. - - An inbound TCP packet from C to A is wrapped in two ESP headers; the - outer header (ESP in tunnel mode) shows B as the source, whereas the - inner header (ESP transport mode) shows C as the source. Upon - arrival at A, the packet would be mapped to an SA based on the SPI, - have the outer header removed, and be decrypted and - integrity-checked. Then it would be matched against the SAD - selectors for this SA, which would specify C as the source and A as - the destination, derived from SPD rule 2. The protected-side - forwarding function would then send it back to the unprotected side - based on the addresses and the next layer protocol (ESP), indicative - of nesting. It is compared against SPD-O (see Figure 3) and found to - match SPD rule 1, so it is BYPASSed. The packet is mapped to an SA - based on the SPI, integrity-checked, and compared against the SAD - selectors derived from SPD rule 3. The forwarding function then - passes it up to the next layer, because it isn't an ESP packet. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 97] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -References - -Normative References - - [BBCDWW98] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, - Z., and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated - Service", RFC 2475, December 1998. - - [Bra97] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate - Requirement Level", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - - [CD98] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message - Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 - (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998. - - [DH98] Deering, S., and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, - Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December - 1998. - - [Eas05] 3rd Eastlake, D., "Cryptographic Algorithm - Implementation Requirements For Encapsulating Security - Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC - 4305, December 2005. - - [HarCar98] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange - (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. - - [Kau05] Kaufman, C., Ed., "The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) - Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005. - - [Ken05a] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", - RFC 4303, December 2005. - - [Ken05b] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, - December 2005. - - [MD90] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC - 1191, November 1990. - - [Mobip] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility - Support in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004. - - [Pos81a] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, - September 1981. - - [Pos81b] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", RFC - 792, September 1981. - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 98] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - [Sch05] Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for use in the - Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 4307, - December 2005. - - [WaKiHo97] Wahl, M., Kille, S., and T. Howes, "Lightweight - Directory Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String - Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC 2253, - December 1997. - -Informative References - - [CoSa04] Condell, M., and L. Sanchez, "On the Deterministic - Enforcement of Un-ordered Security Policies", BBN - Technical Memo 1346, March 2004. - - [FaLiHaMeTr00] Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P. - Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC - 2784, March 2000. - - [Gro02] Grossman, D., "New Terminology and Clarifications for - Diffserv", RFC 3260, April 2002. - [HC03] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source Specific Multicast - for IP", Work in Progress, November 3, 2002. - - [HA94] Haller, N. and R. Atkinson, "On Internet - Authentication", RFC 1704, October 1994. - - [NiBlBaBL98] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black, - "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS - Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474, - December 1998. - - [Per96] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003, - October 1996. - - [RaFlBl01] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The - Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to - IP", RFC 3168, September 2001. - - [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for - the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. - - [RFC2983] Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels", RFC - 2983, October 2000. - - [RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, - "The Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July - 2003. - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 99] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - - [RFC3740] Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group - Security Architecture", RFC 3740, March 2004. - - [RaCoCaDe04] Rajahalme, J., Conta, A., Carpenter, B., and S. - Deering, "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 3697, - March 2004. - - [Sch94] Schneier, B., Applied Cryptography, Section 8.6, John - Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1994. - - [Shi00] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, - May 2000. - - [SMPT01] Shacham, A., Monsour, B., Pereira, R., and M. Thomas, - "IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 3173, - September 2001. - - [ToEgWa04] Touch, J., Eggert, L., and Y. Wang, "Use of IPsec - Transport Mode for Dynamic Routing", RFC 3884, - September 2004. - - [VK83] V.L. Voydock & S.T. Kent, "Security Mechanisms in - High-level Networks", ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 15, - No. 2, June 1983. - -Authors' Addresses - - Stephen Kent - BBN Technologies - 10 Moulton Street - Cambridge, MA 02138 - USA - - Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 - EMail: kent@bbn.com - - - Karen Seo - BBN Technologies - 10 Moulton Street - Cambridge, MA 02138 - USA - - Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 - EMail: kseo@bbn.com - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 100] - -RFC 4301 Security Architecture for IP December 2005 - - -Full Copyright Statement - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). - - This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions - contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors - retain all their rights. - - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS - OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET - ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, - INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE - INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED - WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - -Intellectual Property - - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any - Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to - pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in - this document or the extent to which any license under such rights - might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has - made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information - on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be - found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. - - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any - assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an - attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of - such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this - specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at - http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any - copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary - rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement - this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- - ipr@ietf.org. - -Acknowledgement - - Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the - Internet Society. - - - - - - - -Kent & Seo Standards Track [Page 101] - |